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Groundwork in the Theory of ArgumentationPremissary Relevance

Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: Premissary Relevance [I argue that the property of premissary relevance needs to be tied to arguments understood as speech act complexes, with the pragmatic, social, and communicative implications this connection implies; but premises must not only be formulated to communicate support, they must also actually lend support, and their relevance is a function of their doing so. Explicating premissary relevance is thus a matter of explicating the idea of a premise’s lending support to a conclusion. Our inference warrants make explicit, or are the ground of, our belief that our premises are relevant, by making explicit how we take them to link up with the conclusion. Actual relevance is a function of premises belonging to a set that authoritatively warrants an inference to a conclusion. An authoritative inference warrant will have associated with it a conditional proposition that is true, i.e., that can be justified. A task that remains is to classify inference warrants and their associated conditionals by type, and draw up the general conditions that their justification needs to satisfy. It may be that parallel scholarship studying the Aristotelian doctrine of topoi or argument schemes will contribute to this task.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Groundwork in the Theory of ArgumentationPremissary Relevance

Part of the Argumentation Library Book Series (volume 21)
Editors: Tindale, Christopher W.
Blair, J. Anthony
Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation — Aug 29, 2011
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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
ISBN
978-94-007-2362-7
Pages
61 –73
DOI
10.1007/978-94-007-2363-4_6
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[I argue that the property of premissary relevance needs to be tied to arguments understood as speech act complexes, with the pragmatic, social, and communicative implications this connection implies; but premises must not only be formulated to communicate support, they must also actually lend support, and their relevance is a function of their doing so. Explicating premissary relevance is thus a matter of explicating the idea of a premise’s lending support to a conclusion. Our inference warrants make explicit, or are the ground of, our belief that our premises are relevant, by making explicit how we take them to link up with the conclusion. Actual relevance is a function of premises belonging to a set that authoritatively warrants an inference to a conclusion. An authoritative inference warrant will have associated with it a conditional proposition that is true, i.e., that can be justified. A task that remains is to classify inference warrants and their associated conditionals by type, and draw up the general conditions that their justification needs to satisfy. It may be that parallel scholarship studying the Aristotelian doctrine of topoi or argument schemes will contribute to this task.]

Published: Aug 29, 2011

Keywords: Relevance; Probative relevance; Warrants; Associated conditional; Argument schemes; Informal logic; Premise

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