Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Groundwork in the Theory of ArgumentationThe “Logic” of Informal Logic

Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: The “Logic” of Informal Logic [The purpose of the chapter is to explore some historically-offered possible answers to the question of what alternatives there might be to deduction and induction. I briefly describe and characterize six accounts that seem on the face of it to portray some third type of assessment of an illative move, independent of deductive validity and of inductive strength: those of Wisdom, Toulmin, Wellman, Rescher, defeasible reasoning theorists such as Pollock, and Walton. I then compare these accounts under eight headings. I conclude that the parallel and largely independent development of theories of defeasible reasoning and informal approaches to argument interpretation and appraisal seem to put beyond doubt the empirical fact of such reasoning and argument and to argue for its bona fides. The proposition that such reasoning and arguments are legitimate, one of the founding hypotheses of the informal logic movement, seems to have found fairly widespread confirmation.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Groundwork in the Theory of ArgumentationThe “Logic” of Informal Logic

Part of the Argumentation Library Book Series (volume 21)
Editors: Tindale, Christopher W.
Blair, J. Anthony
Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation — Aug 29, 2011
Download PDF
16 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer-journals/groundwork-in-the-theory-of-argumentation-the-logic-of-informal-logic-METtxLOIIY

References (37)

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
ISBN
978-94-007-2362-7
Pages
101 –117
DOI
10.1007/978-94-007-2363-4_9
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[The purpose of the chapter is to explore some historically-offered possible answers to the question of what alternatives there might be to deduction and induction. I briefly describe and characterize six accounts that seem on the face of it to portray some third type of assessment of an illative move, independent of deductive validity and of inductive strength: those of Wisdom, Toulmin, Wellman, Rescher, defeasible reasoning theorists such as Pollock, and Walton. I then compare these accounts under eight headings. I conclude that the parallel and largely independent development of theories of defeasible reasoning and informal approaches to argument interpretation and appraisal seem to put beyond doubt the empirical fact of such reasoning and argument and to argue for its bona fides. The proposition that such reasoning and arguments are legitimate, one of the founding hypotheses of the informal logic movement, seems to have found fairly widespread confirmation.]

Published: Aug 29, 2011

Keywords: Logic; Informal logic; Non-deductive inference; Defeasible reasoning

There are no references for this article.