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Groundwork in the Theory of ArgumentationWhat Is the Right Amount of Support for a Conclusion?

Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: What Is the Right Amount of Support for a Conclusion? [The question is “when do the premises available to a particular person, S, suffice to justify S in taking given attitude, a, towards a particular proposition, p?” Two answers, deductivism and the Pragma-Dialectical theory, are considered and rejected. It is argued that an argument’s support for its conclusion will be sufficient when it meets its burdens of proof, relying in the final analysis on what may be presumed or accepted without further question. However, the criteria for sufficiency in any argument type vary from field to field, discipline to discipline, and topic to topic, as well as over time, purpose and context. The norms depend on their formulators, users and critics. Among the defining features of fields and disciplines is that for each there is a group (or groups) of practitioners whose expectations of excellence establish both the membership requirements for admission to their ranks and also the qualifications for elevation up the rungs in their internal hierarchies. The hierarchies of authority prescribe, among other things, the standards of evidentiary sufficiency expected of arguments in the field.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Groundwork in the Theory of ArgumentationWhat Is the Right Amount of Support for a Conclusion?

Part of the Argumentation Library Book Series (volume 21)
Editors: Tindale, Christopher W.

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References (7)

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
ISBN
978-94-007-2362-7
Pages
51 –59
DOI
10.1007/978-94-007-2363-4_5
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[The question is “when do the premises available to a particular person, S, suffice to justify S in taking given attitude, a, towards a particular proposition, p?” Two answers, deductivism and the Pragma-Dialectical theory, are considered and rejected. It is argued that an argument’s support for its conclusion will be sufficient when it meets its burdens of proof, relying in the final analysis on what may be presumed or accepted without further question. However, the criteria for sufficiency in any argument type vary from field to field, discipline to discipline, and topic to topic, as well as over time, purpose and context. The norms depend on their formulators, users and critics. Among the defining features of fields and disciplines is that for each there is a group (or groups) of practitioners whose expectations of excellence establish both the membership requirements for admission to their ranks and also the qualifications for elevation up the rungs in their internal hierarchies. The hierarchies of authority prescribe, among other things, the standards of evidentiary sufficiency expected of arguments in the field.]

Published: Aug 29, 2011

Keywords: Sufficient evidence; Sufficiency; Deductivism; Pragma-dialectics; Burden of proof; Field dependency; Informal logic

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