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Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy, Vintage EnthusiasmsTruth and the Liar

Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy, Vintage Enthusiasms: Truth and the Liar [Frege famously Frege, Gottlob claimed that logic is the science of truth: “To discover truths is the task of all science; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth” (Frege, 1956, p. 289). But just like the other foundational concept of set, truth at that time was intimately associated with paradox; in the case of truth, the Liar paradox. The set-theoretical paradoxes had their teeth drawn by being recognised as reductio proofs of assumptions that had seemed too obvious to warrant stating explicitly, but were now seen to be substantive, and more importantly inconsistent. Tarski includes the Liar paradox in his classic discussion of the concept of truth (Tarski, 1956), and developed it, in the form of his famous theorem on the undefinability of truth, as a reductio of the assumption that a language could be semantically closed, in the sense of being able to contain its own truth-predicate.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy, Vintage EnthusiasmsTruth and the Liar

Part of the The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 75)
Editors: DeVidi, David; Hallett, Michael; Clarke, Peter
Howson, Colin
Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy, Vintage Enthusiasms — Jan 27, 2011
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References (20)

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
ISBN
978-94-007-0213-4
Pages
115 –134
DOI
10.1007/978-94-007-0214-1_6
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Frege famously Frege, Gottlob claimed that logic is the science of truth: “To discover truths is the task of all science; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth” (Frege, 1956, p. 289). But just like the other foundational concept of set, truth at that time was intimately associated with paradox; in the case of truth, the Liar paradox. The set-theoretical paradoxes had their teeth drawn by being recognised as reductio proofs of assumptions that had seemed too obvious to warrant stating explicitly, but were now seen to be substantive, and more importantly inconsistent. Tarski includes the Liar paradox in his classic discussion of the concept of truth (Tarski, 1956), and developed it, in the form of his famous theorem on the undefinability of truth, as a reductio of the assumption that a language could be semantically closed, in the sense of being able to contain its own truth-predicate.]

Published: Jan 27, 2011

Keywords: Truth Predicate; Peano Arithmetic; Partial Truth; Informal Reasoning; Liar Paradox

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