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Minimally inconsistent LP

Minimally inconsistent LP Abstract The paper explains how a paraconsistent logician can appropriate all classical reasoning. This is to take consistency as a default assumption, and hence to work within those models of the theory at hand which are minimally inconsistent. The paper spells out the formal application of this strategy to one paraconsistent logic, first-order LP. (See, Ch. 5 of: G. Priest, In Contradiction, Nijhoff, 1987.) The result is a strong non-monotonic paraconsistent logic agreeing with classical logic in consistent situations. It is shown that the logical closure of a theory under this logic is trivial only if its closure under LP is trivial. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png "Studia Logica" Springer Journals

Minimally inconsistent LP

"Studia Logica" , Volume 50 (2): 11 – Jun 1, 1991

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References (9)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
1991 Polish Academy of Sciences
ISSN
0039-3215
eISSN
1572-8730
DOI
10.1007/BF00370190
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract The paper explains how a paraconsistent logician can appropriate all classical reasoning. This is to take consistency as a default assumption, and hence to work within those models of the theory at hand which are minimally inconsistent. The paper spells out the formal application of this strategy to one paraconsistent logic, first-order LP. (See, Ch. 5 of: G. Priest, In Contradiction, Nijhoff, 1987.) The result is a strong non-monotonic paraconsistent logic agreeing with classical logic in consistent situations. It is shown that the logical closure of a theory under this logic is trivial only if its closure under LP is trivial.

Journal

"Studia Logica"Springer Journals

Published: Jun 1, 1991

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