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Peirce and the autonomy of abductive reasoning

Peirce and the autonomy of abductive reasoning Essential to Peirce's distinction among three kinds of reasoning, deduction, induction and abduction, is the claim that each is correlated to a unique species of validity irreducible to that of the others. In particular, abductive validity cannot be analyzed in either deductive or inductive terms, a consequence of considerable importance for the logical and epistemological scrutiny of scientific methods. But when the full structure of abductive argumentation — as viewed by the mature Peirce — is clarified, every inferential step in the process can be seen to dissolve into familiar forms of deductive and inductive reasoning. Specifically, the final stage is a special type of practical inference which, if correct, is deductively valid, while the creative phase, surprisingly, is not inferential at all. In neither is abduction a type of inference to the best explanation. The result is a major reassessment of the relevance of Peirce's views to contemporary methodological studies. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Erkenntnis Springer Journals

Peirce and the autonomy of abductive reasoning

Erkenntnis , Volume 37 (1) – Jul 21, 2004

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References (41)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy, general; Epistemology; Ontology; Ethics; Logic
ISSN
0165-0106
eISSN
1572-8420
DOI
10.1007/BF00220630
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Essential to Peirce's distinction among three kinds of reasoning, deduction, induction and abduction, is the claim that each is correlated to a unique species of validity irreducible to that of the others. In particular, abductive validity cannot be analyzed in either deductive or inductive terms, a consequence of considerable importance for the logical and epistemological scrutiny of scientific methods. But when the full structure of abductive argumentation — as viewed by the mature Peirce — is clarified, every inferential step in the process can be seen to dissolve into familiar forms of deductive and inductive reasoning. Specifically, the final stage is a special type of practical inference which, if correct, is deductively valid, while the creative phase, surprisingly, is not inferential at all. In neither is abduction a type of inference to the best explanation. The result is a major reassessment of the relevance of Peirce's views to contemporary methodological studies.

Journal

ErkenntnisSpringer Journals

Published: Jul 21, 2004

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