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Poland, Germany and State Power in Post-Cold War EuropeDisunity in Diversity: Constitutional Treaty and the QMV

Poland, Germany and State Power in Post-Cold War Europe: Disunity in Diversity: Constitutional... [Chapter 4 argues that the Polish-German clash over the distribution of (qualified majority) voting power in the Council—during the 2003 and 2004 ‘constitution-making’ IGCs and the 2007 Reform Treaty negotiations—is best understood with a view to structure and the two states’ unequal status as members. Faced with an unprecedented explosion of socio-economic diversity in an enlarged EU, Berlin pursued a less ‘degressive’ division of voting power that would allow the biggest and wealthiest members to maintain greater control over Council bargaining outcomes. The comparatively poor and mid-sized Poland, dependent on solidarity and not fully versed in the EU policy game, was determined to defend its privileged Nice Treaty status of an important partner in building blocking coalitions across the EU’s main voting cleavages. But as the empirical record shows, the conflict was further fuelled by the two actors’ unequal ability to steer the reform process or influence the normative assumptions that underpinned the member states’ consensus in favour of institutional change.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Poland, Germany and State Power in Post-Cold War EuropeDisunity in Diversity: Constitutional Treaty and the QMV

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Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019. The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
ISBN
978-1-349-95351-6
Pages
121 –161
DOI
10.1057/978-1-349-95352-3_4
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Chapter 4 argues that the Polish-German clash over the distribution of (qualified majority) voting power in the Council—during the 2003 and 2004 ‘constitution-making’ IGCs and the 2007 Reform Treaty negotiations—is best understood with a view to structure and the two states’ unequal status as members. Faced with an unprecedented explosion of socio-economic diversity in an enlarged EU, Berlin pursued a less ‘degressive’ division of voting power that would allow the biggest and wealthiest members to maintain greater control over Council bargaining outcomes. The comparatively poor and mid-sized Poland, dependent on solidarity and not fully versed in the EU policy game, was determined to defend its privileged Nice Treaty status of an important partner in building blocking coalitions across the EU’s main voting cleavages. But as the empirical record shows, the conflict was further fuelled by the two actors’ unequal ability to steer the reform process or influence the normative assumptions that underpinned the member states’ consensus in favour of institutional change.]

Published: Sep 29, 2018

Keywords: European Union (EU); Council; EU decision-making; Finalité politique; Qualified majority voting; European Convention; Intergovernmental Conference; Draft Treaty; Constitutional Treaty; Treaty of Lisbon; Treaty of Nice; Double majority; Blocking minority; Degressive proportionality; Democratic deficit; Integration avant-garde; Kerneuropa; Institutional efficiency; Democratic legitimacy

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