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C. Cheyne (2001)
Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects
Michael Liston (2004)
Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to PlatonismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy, 82
[For centuries tradition had it that knowledge is justified true belief. Then Edmund Gettier produced cases that refute that traditional view – or so most philosophers think. I disagree. The widespread intuition lying behind the so-called ‘Gettier Cases’ is that there is epistemic bad luck (we can unluckily fail to know), but no epistemic good luck (we cannot luckily know). I reject this puritanical intuition. I also question the externalist or reliabilist views of knowledge and/or justification that the Gettier Cases have spawned.]
Published: Mar 14, 2012
Keywords: True Belief; Reliable Process; Perceptual Belief; Good Luck; Gettier Case
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