Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Rationis DefensorJustified Believing: Avoiding the Paradox

Rationis Defensor: Justified Believing: Avoiding the Paradox [Colin Cheyne has argued that under certain circumstances an internalist or deontological theory of epistemic justification will give rise to a paradox. The paradox, he argues, arises when a principle of epistemic justification is both justifiably believed (in terms of the theory) and false. To avoid this paradox, Cheyne recommends abandoning the principle of justification-transference, which states that acts of believing made on the basis of a justifiably-believed principle are themselves justified. Since such a principle seems essential to any internalist theory of justified believing, internalist theories may also need to be abandoned. I argue that while some theories of epistemic justification may indeed give rise to this paradox, an internalist or deontological theory of subjective justification will avoid it. The reason for this is that a false principle of justified believing does not render acts of believing subjectively unjustified, provided that the agent does not realize that the principle is false.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Rationis DefensorJustified Believing: Avoiding the Paradox

Part of the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 28)
Editors: Maclaurin, James
Rationis Defensor — Mar 14, 2012

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer-journals/rationis-defensor-justified-believing-avoiding-the-paradox-PRs6W50bvL

References (13)

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
ISBN
978-94-007-3982-6
Pages
11 –21
DOI
10.1007/978-94-007-3983-3_2
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Colin Cheyne has argued that under certain circumstances an internalist or deontological theory of epistemic justification will give rise to a paradox. The paradox, he argues, arises when a principle of epistemic justification is both justifiably believed (in terms of the theory) and false. To avoid this paradox, Cheyne recommends abandoning the principle of justification-transference, which states that acts of believing made on the basis of a justifiably-believed principle are themselves justified. Since such a principle seems essential to any internalist theory of justified believing, internalist theories may also need to be abandoned. I argue that while some theories of epistemic justification may indeed give rise to this paradox, an internalist or deontological theory of subjective justification will avoid it. The reason for this is that a false principle of justified believing does not render acts of believing subjectively unjustified, provided that the agent does not realize that the principle is false.]

Published: Mar 14, 2012

Keywords: Justify Belief; Epistemic Justification; Propositional Justification; Epistemic Principle; Doxastic Justification

There are no references for this article.