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Rationis DefensorPost-Fregean Thoughts on Propositional Unity

Rationis Defensor: Post-Fregean Thoughts on Propositional Unity [This note sketches how a theory of procedural semantics may offer a solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition. The current revival of the notion of structured meaning has made the problem of propositional unity pressing. The problem, stated in its simplest form, is how an individual a and a property F combine into the proposition P that a is an F; i.e. how two different kinds of objects combine into a third kind of object capable of having properties that neither of its constituents could have. Constraints imposed on P include that P must be capable of being true/false, being known/believed to be true/false, and occurring as argument of propositional connectives, such as entailment.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Rationis DefensorPost-Fregean Thoughts on Propositional Unity

Part of the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 28)
Editors: Maclaurin, James
Rationis Defensor — Mar 14, 2012

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References (39)

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
ISBN
978-94-007-3982-6
Pages
235 –254
DOI
10.1007/978-94-007-3983-3_17
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[This note sketches how a theory of procedural semantics may offer a solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition. The current revival of the notion of structured meaning has made the problem of propositional unity pressing. The problem, stated in its simplest form, is how an individual a and a property F combine into the proposition P that a is an F; i.e. how two different kinds of objects combine into a third kind of object capable of having properties that neither of its constituents could have. Constraints imposed on P include that P must be capable of being true/false, being known/believed to be true/false, and occurring as argument of propositional connectives, such as entailment.]

Published: Mar 14, 2012

Keywords: Atomic Proposition; Functional Application; Structure Proposition; Russellian Proposition; Procedural Semantic

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