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Rationis DefensorPropositions: Truth vs. Existence

Rationis Defensor: Propositions: Truth vs. Existence [I argue that there is an inherent tension in the notion of a proposition that gives us reason to doubt that there can be any single entity that plays all the roles and possesses all the features normally attributed to propositions. The tension is that some of the roles and features of propositions require them to be essentially representational, while others require them to be non-representational. I first present what I call the standard view of propositions: a series of theses outlining the roles they are normally thought to play and the features they are normally thought to possess. I then highlight a number of tensions inherent in the standard view. I illustrate how this very tension creates problems for some realist theories of propositions. I discuss the distinction between the truth of a proposition and its existence, and argue that paying heed to this distinction allows us to identify, and clear up, a particular confusion that leads us to posit propositions in the first place. Finally, I consider where a rejection of propositions leaves us, ontologically and theoretically.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Rationis DefensorPropositions: Truth vs. Existence

Part of the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 28)
Editors: Maclaurin, James
Dyke, Heather
Rationis Defensor — Mar 14, 2012
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References (16)

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
ISBN
978-94-007-3982-6
Pages
127 –138
DOI
10.1007/978-94-007-3983-3_10
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[I argue that there is an inherent tension in the notion of a proposition that gives us reason to doubt that there can be any single entity that plays all the roles and possesses all the features normally attributed to propositions. The tension is that some of the roles and features of propositions require them to be essentially representational, while others require them to be non-representational. I first present what I call the standard view of propositions: a series of theses outlining the roles they are normally thought to play and the features they are normally thought to possess. I then highlight a number of tensions inherent in the standard view. I illustrate how this very tension creates problems for some realist theories of propositions. I discuss the distinction between the truth of a proposition and its existence, and argue that paying heed to this distinction allows us to identify, and clear up, a particular confusion that leads us to posit propositions in the first place. Finally, I consider where a rejection of propositions leaves us, ontologically and theoretically.]

Published: Mar 14, 2012

Keywords: Truth Condition; Tall Building; Standard View; True Proposition; Abstract Entity

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