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Rationis DefensorSpread Worlds, Plenitude and Modal Realism: A Problem for David Lewis

Rationis Defensor: Spread Worlds, Plenitude and Modal Realism: A Problem for David Lewis [In his metaphysical summa of 1986, The Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis famously defends a doctrine he calls ‘modal realism’, the idea that to account for the fact that some things are possible and some things are necessary we must postulate an infinity possible worlds, concrete entities like our own universe, but cut off from us in space and time. Possible worlds are required to account for the facts of modality without assuming that modality is primitive – that there are irreducibly modal facts. We argue that on one reading, Lewis’s theory licenses us to assume maverick possible worlds which spread through logical space gobbling up all the rest. Because they exclude alternatives, these worlds result in contradictions, since different spread worlds are incompatible with one another. Plainly Lewis’s theory must be amended to exclude these excluders. But, we maintain, this cannot be done without bringing in modal primitives. And once we admit modal primitives, bang goes the rationale for Lewis’s modal realism.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Rationis DefensorSpread Worlds, Plenitude and Modal Realism: A Problem for David Lewis

Part of the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 28)
Editors: Maclaurin, James
Rationis Defensor — Mar 14, 2012

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References (19)

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
ISBN
978-94-007-3982-6
Pages
155 –176
DOI
10.1007/978-94-007-3983-3_12
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[In his metaphysical summa of 1986, The Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis famously defends a doctrine he calls ‘modal realism’, the idea that to account for the fact that some things are possible and some things are necessary we must postulate an infinity possible worlds, concrete entities like our own universe, but cut off from us in space and time. Possible worlds are required to account for the facts of modality without assuming that modality is primitive – that there are irreducibly modal facts. We argue that on one reading, Lewis’s theory licenses us to assume maverick possible worlds which spread through logical space gobbling up all the rest. Because they exclude alternatives, these worlds result in contradictions, since different spread worlds are incompatible with one another. Plainly Lewis’s theory must be amended to exclude these excluders. But, we maintain, this cannot be done without bringing in modal primitives. And once we admit modal primitives, bang goes the rationale for Lewis’s modal realism.]

Published: Mar 14, 2012

Keywords: Modal Property; Logical Space; Modal Realism; Dispositional Property; Consistent Describability

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