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Reflections on Theoretical Issues in Argumentation TheoryConductive Argumentation, Degrees of Confidence, and the Communication of Uncertainty

Reflections on Theoretical Issues in Argumentation Theory: Conductive Argumentation, Degrees of... [We argue in this paper that there is an epistemic obligation to communicate the appropriate degree of confidence when asserting conclusions in conductive argumentation. This runs contrary to the position of those theorists who contend that once the conclusion to a conductive argument is drawn, it is simply asserted in an unqualified manner. We argue, on the contrary, that, in many contexts, we do qualify our conclusions and further, that we have an epistemic responsibility to do so. As an illustration, we discuss the case of the Italian scientists tried for failing to convey to the public appropriate warnings of the risks of the earthquake in L’Aquila. ] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Reflections on Theoretical Issues in Argumentation TheoryConductive Argumentation, Degrees of Confidence, and the Communication of Uncertainty

Part of the Argumentation Library Book Series (volume 28)
Editors: van Eemeren, Frans H.; Garssen, Bart
Bailin, Sharon; Battersby, Mark
Reflections on Theoretical Issues in Argumentation Theory — Aug 9, 2015
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References (8)

Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
ISBN
978-3-319-21102-2
Pages
71 –82
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-21103-9_5
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[We argue in this paper that there is an epistemic obligation to communicate the appropriate degree of confidence when asserting conclusions in conductive argumentation. This runs contrary to the position of those theorists who contend that once the conclusion to a conductive argument is drawn, it is simply asserted in an unqualified manner. We argue, on the contrary, that, in many contexts, we do qualify our conclusions and further, that we have an epistemic responsibility to do so. As an illustration, we discuss the case of the Italian scientists tried for failing to convey to the public appropriate warnings of the risks of the earthquake in L’Aquila. ]

Published: Aug 9, 2015

Keywords: Justify Belief; Medium Confidence; Epistemic Authority; Individual Argument; Epistemic Obligation

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