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Scientia in Early Modern PhilosophyScientia and the Sciences in Descartes

Scientia in Early Modern Philosophy: Scientia and the Sciences in Descartes [Descartes appears to have more than one conception of science. First, there is the relatively exacting conception that he associates with scientia. This is the conception that comes into play in a well-known passage from the Replies in which he explains how an atheist can and can’t know that the angles of a triangle add up to two right angles: the atheist cannot know in the sense of having an unshakeable conviction that the two angles add up to two right angles, but the atheist can know—grasp for as long as no searching doubt is conjured up—the truth that the two angles add up to two right angles. So, exactingly conceived, science is the ultra-stable grasp of truth, ultra-stable because supported by general reasons for confidence in the methodically applied human intellect. Less exactingly conceived, science is successful problem-solving or explanation in terms of a small number of widely applicable “simple” notions—shape, size, number position or motion in the case of physics.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Scientia in Early Modern PhilosophyScientia and the Sciences in Descartes

Part of the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 24)
Editors: Sorell, Tom; Rogers, G.A.; Kraye, Jill

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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
ISBN
978-90-481-3076-4
Pages
71 –82
DOI
10.1007/978-90-481-3077-1_5
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Descartes appears to have more than one conception of science. First, there is the relatively exacting conception that he associates with scientia. This is the conception that comes into play in a well-known passage from the Replies in which he explains how an atheist can and can’t know that the angles of a triangle add up to two right angles: the atheist cannot know in the sense of having an unshakeable conviction that the two angles add up to two right angles, but the atheist can know—grasp for as long as no searching doubt is conjured up—the truth that the two angles add up to two right angles. So, exactingly conceived, science is the ultra-stable grasp of truth, ultra-stable because supported by general reasons for confidence in the methodically applied human intellect. Less exactingly conceived, science is successful problem-solving or explanation in terms of a small number of widely applicable “simple” notions—shape, size, number position or motion in the case of physics.]

Published: Sep 28, 2009

Keywords: Eternal Truth; Human Intellect; Human Benefit; French Edition; Metaphysical Truth

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