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Scientific Composition and Metaphysical GroundAnti-Reductionism, Anti-Rationalism, and the Material Constitution of the Mental

Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground: Anti-Reductionism, Anti-Rationalism, and the... [I’ve set out and defended an account of the vertical relations between the mental and more fundamental levels in terms of a theory of material constitution (Pereboom 2002, 2011). A controversial feature of this account is that it rejects identity as the distinctive interlevel relation, by contrast with standard reductive positions and, perhaps surprisingly, with the rival nonreductive subset view. Instead, it appeals to a fundamental made-up-of relation. The criticism that this relation and the theory are obscure is diagnosed as presupposing the unfounded rationalist claim that accounts of this sort can only appeal to conceptual analysis and logical relations such as identity.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Scientific Composition and Metaphysical GroundAnti-Reductionism, Anti-Rationalism, and the Material Constitution of the Mental

Part of the New Directions in the Philosophy of Science Book Series
Editors: Aizawa, Kenneth; Gillett, Carl
Pereboom, Derk
Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground — Nov 9, 2016
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References (24)

Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016. The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
ISBN
978-1-137-56215-9
Pages
123 –140
DOI
10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6_5
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[I’ve set out and defended an account of the vertical relations between the mental and more fundamental levels in terms of a theory of material constitution (Pereboom 2002, 2011). A controversial feature of this account is that it rejects identity as the distinctive interlevel relation, by contrast with standard reductive positions and, perhaps surprisingly, with the rival nonreductive subset view. Instead, it appeals to a fundamental made-up-of relation. The criticism that this relation and the theory are obscure is diagnosed as presupposing the unfounded rationalist claim that accounts of this sort can only appeal to conceptual analysis and logical relations such as identity.]

Published: Nov 9, 2016

Keywords: Causal Power; Material Constitution; Property Instance; Exclusion Problem; Subset View

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