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Scientific Composition and Metaphysical GroundGrounding and the Formulation of Physicalism

Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground: Grounding and the Formulation of Physicalism [Some philosophers have proposed appealing to the alleged relation of grounding in a formulation of physicalism (or materialism), thus making physicalism the thesis that everything, including the mental, is either physical or grounded in the physical. This chapter, however, provides three reasons for not so appealing. (1) Grounding probably can’t do the key job it would need to do: explicating the “nothing over and above” relation in the physicalist claim that (say) the mental is nothing over and above the physical. (2) We don’t need to appeal to grounding in a formulation of physicalism, since we already have a satisfactory relation of realization to appeal to. (3) The holding of a primitive relation of grounding is probably not even compatible with physicalism.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Scientific Composition and Metaphysical GroundGrounding and the Formulation of Physicalism

Part of the New Directions in the Philosophy of Science Book Series
Editors: Aizawa, Kenneth; Gillett, Carl
Melnyk, Andrew
Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground — Nov 9, 2016
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References (13)

Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016. The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
ISBN
978-1-137-56215-9
Pages
249 –269
DOI
10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6_9
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Some philosophers have proposed appealing to the alleged relation of grounding in a formulation of physicalism (or materialism), thus making physicalism the thesis that everything, including the mental, is either physical or grounded in the physical. This chapter, however, provides three reasons for not so appealing. (1) Grounding probably can’t do the key job it would need to do: explicating the “nothing over and above” relation in the physicalist claim that (say) the mental is nothing over and above the physical. (2) We don’t need to appeal to grounding in a formulation of physicalism, since we already have a satisfactory relation of realization to appeal to. (3) The holding of a primitive relation of grounding is probably not even compatible with physicalism.]

Published: Nov 9, 2016

Keywords: Causal Power; Physical Entity; Mental Causation; Comprehensive Doctrine; Identity Claim

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