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Scientific Composition and Metaphysical GroundGrounding in the Philosophy of Mind: A Defense

Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground: Grounding in the Philosophy of Mind: A Defense [One of the main trends in metaphysics in recent years has been the development and defense of novel conceptual frameworks for representing facts about fundamentality. Of particular interest has been the concept of grounding. Often the introduction of these new concepts is motivated by the argument that other notions metaphysicians use in order to frame their positions are inadequate to the task of characterizing the important problems and views of metaphysics. These suggestions have been met with mixed reactions in philosophical circles. Some of those working on first-order metaphysical problems were quick to see the utility of these notions. However, in philosophy of mind, these proposals have been met with skepticism. A commonly voiced complaint is that these metaphysical concepts are philosophically superfluous; they add nothing to the concepts philosophers of mind have already had in their toolboxes for years. I will argue that by deploying the conceptual distinctions introduced by especially Fine, we are able to resolve debates that have been carrying on in the philosophy of mind for decades by formulating novel, clear, and conciliatory positions.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Scientific Composition and Metaphysical GroundGrounding in the Philosophy of Mind: A Defense

Part of the New Directions in the Philosophy of Science Book Series
Editors: Aizawa, Kenneth; Gillett, Carl
Ney, Alyssa
Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground — Nov 9, 2016
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References (31)

Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016. The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
ISBN
978-1-137-56215-9
Pages
271 –300
DOI
10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6_10
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[One of the main trends in metaphysics in recent years has been the development and defense of novel conceptual frameworks for representing facts about fundamentality. Of particular interest has been the concept of grounding. Often the introduction of these new concepts is motivated by the argument that other notions metaphysicians use in order to frame their positions are inadequate to the task of characterizing the important problems and views of metaphysics. These suggestions have been met with mixed reactions in philosophical circles. Some of those working on first-order metaphysical problems were quick to see the utility of these notions. However, in philosophy of mind, these proposals have been met with skepticism. A commonly voiced complaint is that these metaphysical concepts are philosophically superfluous; they add nothing to the concepts philosophers of mind have already had in their toolboxes for years. I will argue that by deploying the conceptual distinctions introduced by especially Fine, we are able to resolve debates that have been carrying on in the philosophy of mind for decades by formulating novel, clear, and conciliatory positions.]

Published: Nov 9, 2016

Keywords: Special Science; Intrinsic Structure; Withdrawal Behavior; Attitude Ascription; Ontological Dependence

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