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Scientific Composition and Metaphysical GroundNew Mechanistic Explanation and the Need for Explanatory Constraints

Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground: New Mechanistic Explanation and the Need for... [This chapter critiques the new mechanistic explanatory program on grounds that, even when applied to the kinds of examples that it was originally designed to treat, it does not distinguish correct explanations from those that blunder. First, I offer a systematization of the explanatory account, one according to which explanations are mechanistic models that satisfy three desiderata: they must (1) represent causal relations, (2) describe the proper parts, and (3) depict the system at the right “level.” Second, I argue that even the most developed attempts to fulfill these desiderata fall short by failing to appropriately constrain explanatorily apt mechanistic models.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Scientific Composition and Metaphysical GroundNew Mechanistic Explanation and the Need for Explanatory Constraints

Part of the New Directions in the Philosophy of Science Book Series
Editors: Aizawa, Kenneth; Gillett, Carl
Franklin-Hall, L. R.
Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground — Nov 9, 2016
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References (44)

Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016. The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
ISBN
978-1-137-56215-9
Pages
41 –74
DOI
10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6_2
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[This chapter critiques the new mechanistic explanatory program on grounds that, even when applied to the kinds of examples that it was originally designed to treat, it does not distinguish correct explanations from those that blunder. First, I offer a systematization of the explanatory account, one according to which explanations are mechanistic models that satisfy three desiderata: they must (1) represent causal relations, (2) describe the proper parts, and (3) depict the system at the right “level.” Second, I argue that even the most developed attempts to fulfill these desiderata fall short by failing to appropriately constrain explanatorily apt mechanistic models.]

Published: Nov 9, 2016

Keywords: Mechanistic Model; Mechanistic Explanation; Axon Terminal; Good Part; Output Relationship

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