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- Publisher
- Palgrave Macmillan UK
- Copyright
- © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016. The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
- ISBN
- 978-1-137-56215-9
- Pages
- 205 –247
- DOI
- 10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6_8
- Publisher site
- See Chapter on Publisher Site
Abstract
[Compositional explanations in the sciences have been amazingly successful. Given their success, I outline a strategy focused on such compositional explanation that I term “Engagement” that I argue offers the best prospects for illuminating the compositional concepts of such explanations and also the metaphysics of nature itself. In contrast, I show the prominent philosophical accounts of verticality all fail to follow Engagement and hence provide inadequate accounts of verticality in compositional explanation and nature. I also detail how a minority approach in philosophy, that does follow Engagement, offers the most promising account of verticality in science and nature. My conclusion is that in the future, philosophers interested in the metaphysics of nature, and scientific composition, need to follow the rules of Engagement.]
Published: Nov 9, 2016
Keywords: Biological Individual; Vertical Relation; Compositional Relation; Mutual Manipulability; Analytic Metaphysic