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[The central argument defended in this final chapter, is that the relationship between the explanatory and purpose-based approaches to the ontology of well-being (explored in Chap. 8), is complex and dynamic, reflecting our conflicting experiences of time, emotion, and self-consciousness. The main assumption, to be explored and defended further here, is that plausible accounts of well-being must hold these conflicting experiences in tension to sustain and enhance well-being. Moreover, examining this tension, opens up further debate concerning how well-being is best promoted. For example, these conflicting experiences do not necessarily imply that a person should pursue ‘balance’ in her life to enhance her well-being, experiencing, say, roughly equivalent amounts of unconscious absorption and self-conscious critical reflection. Instead, it suggests that a person should ‘attune’ her life to the idiosyncratic and conflicting ontological characteristics of who she is, which may, or may not, include pursuing this kind of ‘balanced life’. Attunement reflects the very particularised and unique expressions of this person, and how she is leading her life, with the ‘valued objects’ she pursues also often being incommensurable and therefore largely incomparable. More broadly, recognising this kind of incommensurability also generates normative conflicts concerning how well-being is best understood and promoted in social policy and welfare practice. Subsequently, the conflicts and tensions implied in this deeply pluralist understanding of well-being, allows for multi-layered and rich experiences of well-being. The resulting variety and complexity of these experiences need to be fully accommodated when promoting well-being in social policy and welfare practice. Finally, in the concluding remarks, a summary is made of the principal assertions defended in the book, and its defence of what is called here, The Ontology of Well-Being Thesis (TOWT).]
Published: Nov 12, 2022
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