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The Ontology of Well-Being in Social Policy and Welfare Practice Well-Being, Pain and Parfit: Time, Self-Interest and Pensions Policy

The Ontology of Well-Being in Social Policy and Welfare Practice : Well-Being, Pain and Parfit:... [This chapter explores how classical liberal accounts of well-being depend on certain views of self-interest, experiences of time, and ontological accounts of personal identity. For example, Adam Smith, Henry Sidgwick, and John Rawls, variously argue that a person acting in her own self-interest should have a more-or-less neutral attitude to time. Consequently, she should see her future self as having the same importance as her present self and behave accordingly. The choices she makes are therefore based on what might be called ‘holistic prudence’. So, her choices are informed by her ‘stepping-back’ from her presently orientated subjective viewpoint. She then takes an objective stock of her life led as a whole, while also being open to advice and correction regarding her present desires and orientations. However, there are notorious problems with this liberal view which are examined here, via what is called, The Ontology of Well-Being Thesis (TOWT). The main argument is that these problems can be addressed by focussing on the shared ontological features of the human condition identified and explored in Chap. 2 and underpinning TOWT. Specifically, our conflicting experiences of time are examined, which Derek Parfit also explores in his seminal book, Reasons and persons (1987). The argument is that the classical liberal view of self-interest, and correspondingly temporal neutrality and ‘objectivity’, usefully explains individual attitudes regarding future-plans. It does not, though, recognise other ontological biases we have toward the present and near-future, over the past and distant-future, which, for Parfit, are difficult to deny. It is these biases which profoundly affect how aspects of social policy and welfare practices are understood and promoted, notably concerning state-governed pensions policy.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

The Ontology of Well-Being in Social Policy and Welfare Practice Well-Being, Pain and Parfit: Time, Self-Interest and Pensions Policy

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References (1)

  • A Alexandrova (2016)

    389

Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
ISBN
978-3-031-18141-2
Pages
63 –91
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-18142-9_3
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[This chapter explores how classical liberal accounts of well-being depend on certain views of self-interest, experiences of time, and ontological accounts of personal identity. For example, Adam Smith, Henry Sidgwick, and John Rawls, variously argue that a person acting in her own self-interest should have a more-or-less neutral attitude to time. Consequently, she should see her future self as having the same importance as her present self and behave accordingly. The choices she makes are therefore based on what might be called ‘holistic prudence’. So, her choices are informed by her ‘stepping-back’ from her presently orientated subjective viewpoint. She then takes an objective stock of her life led as a whole, while also being open to advice and correction regarding her present desires and orientations. However, there are notorious problems with this liberal view which are examined here, via what is called, The Ontology of Well-Being Thesis (TOWT). The main argument is that these problems can be addressed by focussing on the shared ontological features of the human condition identified and explored in Chap. 2 and underpinning TOWT. Specifically, our conflicting experiences of time are examined, which Derek Parfit also explores in his seminal book, Reasons and persons (1987). The argument is that the classical liberal view of self-interest, and correspondingly temporal neutrality and ‘objectivity’, usefully explains individual attitudes regarding future-plans. It does not, though, recognise other ontological biases we have toward the present and near-future, over the past and distant-future, which, for Parfit, are difficult to deny. It is these biases which profoundly affect how aspects of social policy and welfare practices are understood and promoted, notably concerning state-governed pensions policy.]

Published: Nov 12, 2022

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