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Turkey, Russia and Iran in the Middle EastTurkey and the Syrian Insurgency: From Facilitator to Overlord

Turkey, Russia and Iran in the Middle East: Turkey and the Syrian Insurgency: From Facilitator to... [In the first years of the Syrian insurgency, Turkey adopted a hands-off approach by allowing anti-Asad militants and their foreign patrons to use its territory while minimally intervening in the rebellion’s internal affairs. However, as Gulf States disinvested from the Syrian conflict from 2015 onward, and as the Turkish army entered Syria in 2016, Ankara emerged as the chief patron of northern rebel factions. Turkey’s management of the Syrian rebellion during that period has featured four main characteristics: first, the AKP government has frequently relied on intermediaries recruited on the basis of shared ethnicity, in particular Turkmens, or ideology, such as Muslim Brotherhood aligned factions like Faylaq al-Sham; second, whereas Gulf States privileged a network-based, clientelistic approach, Turkey has sought to unify Syrian rebels through institution-building, a strategy best illustrated by the establishment of the Syrian National Army in 2017; third, a changing strategic context has led Ankara to profoundly reshape the purpose of the Syrian rebellion, away from its anti-Assad agenda and in support of Turkey’s priorities; fourth, in its relations with Jihadi groups, Turkey has displayed a risk-averse approach characterized by a combination of engagement and discreet pressures.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Turkey, Russia and Iran in the Middle EastTurkey and the Syrian Insurgency: From Facilitator to Overlord

Part of the The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy Book Series
Editors: Balci, Bayram; Monceau, Nicolas
Pierret, Thomas
Turkey, Russia and Iran in the Middle East — Sep 15, 2021
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References (2)

Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
ISBN
978-3-030-80290-5
Pages
59 –77
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-80291-2_4
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[In the first years of the Syrian insurgency, Turkey adopted a hands-off approach by allowing anti-Asad militants and their foreign patrons to use its territory while minimally intervening in the rebellion’s internal affairs. However, as Gulf States disinvested from the Syrian conflict from 2015 onward, and as the Turkish army entered Syria in 2016, Ankara emerged as the chief patron of northern rebel factions. Turkey’s management of the Syrian rebellion during that period has featured four main characteristics: first, the AKP government has frequently relied on intermediaries recruited on the basis of shared ethnicity, in particular Turkmens, or ideology, such as Muslim Brotherhood aligned factions like Faylaq al-Sham; second, whereas Gulf States privileged a network-based, clientelistic approach, Turkey has sought to unify Syrian rebels through institution-building, a strategy best illustrated by the establishment of the Syrian National Army in 2017; third, a changing strategic context has led Ankara to profoundly reshape the purpose of the Syrian rebellion, away from its anti-Assad agenda and in support of Turkey’s priorities; fourth, in its relations with Jihadi groups, Turkey has displayed a risk-averse approach characterized by a combination of engagement and discreet pressures.]

Published: Sep 15, 2021

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