When Management Control Shapes Interorganizational Relationships The Case of the Introduction of a Dashboard in the Health and Social Care Sector

Célia Lemaire

Lemaire, Célia

2021-09-06 00:00:00

The objective of the article is to show the role of management control systems (MCSs) in the construction of inter-organizational relationships (IORs). Based on a qualitative study of the implementation of a dashboard in the health and social care sector, the results show that the introduction of an MCS helps to shape the IORs by initiating them, formalizing them and projecting the relationships that each organization has with the definition of performance conveyed by the MCS. Showing that the purpose of the control is nourished by the ambiva- lence of the relationship the organizations have with the MCS, the article also contributes to the literature regarding the diffusion of a performance, including competition and opti - mization based on quantified results among the priority concerns of the actors of the sector. The research highlights the mechanisms through which the MCS change values initially far removed from the culture of a sector, into acceptable, indisputable and inescapable values. KEY WORDS: MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS, INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE FACILITIES AND SERVICES, AMBIVALENCE. Introduction One of my friends [...] at a care home facility in [place of cluster during the Covid-19 crisis], has just been through a catastrophic fortnight. There have been deaths in numbers, en masse, with no capacity to respond; he was ove- rwhelmed by events. I don't really wish that on anyone... And this appalling situation illustrates the inextricable difficulties met by a facility that is not very organized collectively... [E]verything rested on the director, who can, at COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 2 times, make decisions that were aggravating factors, such as to let people work even if they were sick... it was a time bomb. (Director of an association for disabled people, April 2020, during COVID-19 pandemic). As the Director mentioned above, the solitude of decision-making, the absence of exchange, the lack of a professional network can lead to situations that have tragic consequences. While the human impact is immediately visible in the health and social care efi ld , this crisis has served as a reminder that having strong relationships with other organizations can be crucial. Developing inter-organizational relationships (IORs) means forging links that are both socially and economically nourished between organizations and that go beyond the framework of a simple market transaction (Forgues et al., 2006). In fos- tering the exchange of information and sharing of practices by moving from one organization to another, control processes have an important role to play in IORs because they create “a more explicit awareness of the interdependency of action and the role which joint action can play in organizational success” (Hopwood, 1996, p. 589). It is, therefore, necessary to develop research on inter- organizational control as “the scope of the activity of management control has become enlarged and is no longer confined within the legal boundaries of the organization” (Otley, 1994, p. 293). e Th call of these authors, combined with a multiplication of IORs, has led to the development of research on inter-organi- zational control (Nogatchewsky, 2009). Based on cases of joint ventures (Cäker & Siverbo, 2011), franchises (Goullet & Meyssonnier, 2011), and buyer-sup- plier relationships (Donada & Nogatchewsky, 2006), those works have focused mainly on dual inter-organizational relations (between two entities), with few investigating IORs involving multiple organizations (Marques et al., 2011). e Th latter are, however, of specic fi interest when it comes to control: the multiplicity of stakeholders makes convergence towards a common objective more complex (Kickert et al., 1997) and inter-organizational management control systems (MCSs) are precisely intended to ensure this convergence. Indeed, these are control mechanisms deployed to inufl ence the behavior of an organization in 1. Health and social care institutions and services provide support to the 4.6 million people with some form of disability and the 1.3 million dependent elderly people, or 8% of the over-60s. During the COVID-19 crisis, the mortality rate of people accompanied in these facilities was particularly high. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 3 order to achieve inter-organizational objectives (Das & Teng, 1998; Marques et al., 2011; Dekker, 2004) and to inufl ence individual behavior (Sebti et al., 2015). In addition to facilitating transactional exchanges by preventing risks (Anderson et al., 2016) and participating in the performance of IORs (Pernot & Roodhooft, 2014), MCSs affect the relational dimensions of exchanges between organizations (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Donada et al., 2019) and between indivi- duals representing these organizations (Sebti et al., 2015). Investigating their relational impacts, MCSs are seen as important drivers of change. eTh y contribute by supporting decision making, for example in the selection of partners (Dekker, 2008), provide support for the formalization of cooperation, thus strengthening IORs (Håkansson & Lind, 2004) play a media- ting role, e.g., by disseminating public policies and translating them into daily practices within organizations (Barretta & Busco, 2011) and play a decisive role in building trust between partners (Vosselman & Meer-Kooistra, 2009). However, in this research, MCSs intervene indirectly on IORs and their potential as rela- tionship builders is not highlighted. This article seeks to understand how the introduction of MCSs contributes concretely to the construction of IORs. To do this, we conducted efi ld research on the introduction of a dashboard (the MCS) in the health and social care sector (studying the relationships between organizations in this sector). Qualitative data was collected over a period of eighteen months (35 meetings spread over 250 days of attendance). To complete this active observation, project documents were collected, and interviews were conducted with the managers of 66 health and social care facilities and services (HSCFSs) to identify the effects of the introduction of the dashboard on IORs between HSCFSs. Detailing the elements of control from Malmi and Brown's (2008) typology into three sets (administrative, instrumental and cultural), we explain the effects of each of these elements on the relationships between organizations in the sec- tor. Research results show that the introduction of MCSs contributes to the construction of IORs through differentiated mechanisms depending on the control elements. e Th administrative element has made it possible to initiate informal relationships between organizations. e Th formalization of these rela - tions was ensured by the instrumental elements, which led to a dynamic of coo- peration and competition, introducing ambivalence into the IORs. Accentuating 2. The vast majority of work on inter-organizational control deals with the relationships between organizations. A notable exception is the work on the identity-based use of control devices in the case of inter-organizational relations (Sebti et al., 2015), which focuses on power relations between and within professional classes. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 4 this ambivalence, the cultural element reveals the relationship that organizations have with the MCS and the conception of performance that it entails. In short, the introduction of MCSs contributes to the construction of IORs by initiating, formalizing and projecting the relationship that each organization has with the definition of performance conveyed by the MCSs. In the case stu - died, this led to exacerbating the ambivalence that HSCFSs have with the tool, which had the effect of reinforcing the “ managerialization” (Kurunmäki, 2009) and “accountingization” (Kraus, 2012) of the sector, introducing competition and optimization based on quantiefi d results among the priority concerns of the actors in the sector. Highlighting the constructive potential of IORs for the introduction of the dashboard in the health and social care efi ld, the article contributes, on the one hand, to work dealing with the links between MCSs and IORs, and on the other, to research on the introduction of performance in a sense unfamiliar to the actors concerned. e Th first section of this paper outlines how the literature addresses the effects of MCSs on IORs, detailing the control elements included in these MCSs. e Th second section describes the design of the qualitative efi ld research. e Th results are then presented in a third section and discussed in a final section preceding the conclusion. 1. Management Control Systems for Inter-Organizational Relationships 1.1. MCSs in Inter-Organizational Control Inter-organizational relationships (IORs) refer to the links between organi- zations that are both socially and economically nurtured and that are woven through the intervention of individuals acting on behalf of their organizations (Forgues et al., 2006). Research on control mechanisms in IORs mostly investi- gates dual and asymmetrical relationships. Based on the study of buyer-supplier relationships, Nogatchewsky's (2009) work addresses the impact of the contin- gent characteristics of dual IORs on the type of control that organizations will COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 5 implement. e Th explanation of the types of control (Ouchi, 1980) used in these IORs enriches the conception of control associated with formal and explicit sys- tems by adding the informal and tacit dimensions of control . Analyzing the modes of control between franchisor and franchisee, the article of Goullet & Meyssonnier (2011) shows the relative importance of control levers (Simons, 1995) during four relational phases. Among the inter-organizational control mechanisms, the MCSs are the subject of specic fi work. Although intra- and inter-organizational management control systems pursue similar objectives (Cäker & Siverbo, 2011), the targets of inter-organizational controls are separated by organizational boundaries. This singularity has an impact on the scope and the nature of control. In our study, inter-organizational MCSs are understood as control devices deployed to inufl ence an organization's behavior in order to achieve inter-organizatio - nal objectives (Das & Teng, 1998; Dekker, 2004; Marques et al., 2011) and to inufl ence individual behavior (Sebti et al., 2015). For Dekker (2016), organizations introduce MCSs for the creation of the IORs (e.g., Ding et al., 2013; Neumann, 2010), for the definition and manage - ment of inter-organizational mechanisms and practices (Cäker & Siverbo, 2011; Dekker et al., 2013; Langefi ld-Smith & Smith, 2003) and for the purpose of relationship management (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2003; Mouritsen et al., 2001). While there is evidence of the inufl ence of MCSs on IORs (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Donada et al., 2019), the literature is not unanimous and presents contras- ting results regarding the valence of these effects. Emphasizing their positive nature, Mahama (2006) shows that MCSs facilitate socialization and improve inter-organizational performance. eTh y actively participate in improving coor - dination (Håkansson & Lind, 2004); and support change (Busco et al., 2008) by introducing routines that induce predictability (Busco et al., 2006). Seen as condfi ence-building technologies (Vosselman & Meer-Kooistra, 2009) or as 3. For this author, control by the market is based on a classical economic conception according to which the existence of the market in itself allows the regulation of exchanges between organizational actors based on supply and demand. Bureaucratic control addresses the formalized, procedural and hierarchical dimensions of control. Clinical control refers to social, informal and tacit. 4. An abundant literature on the link between trust and control has developed since the following article: Das, T.K., &. Teng, B-S. (1998). Between trust and control: Developing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances. Academy of Management Review, 23(3),491-512. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 6 vectors of this condfi ence (V élez et al., 2008), their importance increases with the degree of risk (Ding et al., 2013). Pointing to their negative effects, other research shows that inter-organiza - tional control can hinder IORs. In addition to the frequency of failure in their implementation (Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005), the introduction of MCSs can be experienced as evidence of mistrust (Neu, 1991), thus preventing the IOR from developing. Trapped in contradictory dynamics responding to multiple stake- holder interests (Busco et al., 2008), MCSs can freeze these conflicting positions and render IORs inoperative. Paradoxically, their implementation can lead to less control of the IOR if they are not specicfi ally adapted (Boland et al., 2008). Since they must be specic fi to each IOR, and not imported in a mimetic way to be effective, the cost of inter-organizational MCSs may constitute an additional obstacle to their introduction (Anderson et al., 2016). Because positive and negative aspects are sometimes highlighted in the same article, the effects of MCSs may seem paradoxical (Agndal & Nilsson, 2019). eTh y have the potential to reinforce and undermine the potential to manage risks and tensions between organizations (Busco et al., 2008). e Th lack of consensus in the research on the effects of MCSs on IORs leads to further investigation of this issue, detailing the control elements that are included in the MCS. 1.2. Control Elements in IORs To clarify the nature of the control exercised by MCSs, we propose to break down each of their elements using Malmi and Brown's (2008) typology. Already applied in the accounting literature in intra-organizational contexts (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Elbashir et al., 2011; Tessier & Otley, 2012; Carlsson-Wall et al., 2017), this model has not been explicitly used in an inter-organizational context. It is, however, relevant for distinguishing the different dimensions of aggregate control in MCSs. e Th typology distinguishes three sets of control elements (see Table 1): the structure of control is provided by the administrative element; the planning, cybernetic and reward elements constitute a level of control that we have grouped together as instrumental elements of control; the cultural element of control is the broadest and deepest within organizations and it encompasses the other elements. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 7 Table 1: Elements of control, according to Malmi and Brown (2008) Cultural Elements of Control Clans Values Symbols Instrumental Elements of Control Planning Cybernetic controls Financial Non-finan- Hybrid Reward and Long-term Short-term measu- cial mea- mea- compensation Budgets planning planning rement surement suring systems systems systems Administrative Elements of Control Governance structure Organizational structure Policies and procedures e Th following paragraphs detail the use of each of these elements of control in inter-organizational contexts from an integrative perspective (Dumez, 2011), in the sense that we include work that adopts distinct epistemologies, has tradi- tional or more critical approaches, and relies on qualitative or quantitative data; they have in common that they study one or more elements of MCSs in the IORs. 1.2.1. THE ADMINISTR ATIVE ELEMENT AND THE IORS e Th administrative element of control is composed of organizational struc - tures and configurations that provide direction for behaviors and is composed of governance models, procedures and policies that define expected tasks and pro - cesses (Malmi & Brown, 2008). Applied to the inter-organizational level, it desi- gnates the formal structure that governs the relationship, including the nature of the contract (e.g., franchise), the terms of governance (more or less asymmetrical relationships with dependence on one of the organizations, with or without the existence of hierarchical relationships) or the procedures that govern IORs (e.g., group purchasing processes). eTh se formal structures are generally the result of a combination of controls within the IORs. Beyond the pure forms of market governance associated with competition control and hierarchical, authority- based governance (Williamson, 1975), hybrid forms of control rely on arbitra- tors for conflict resolution and performance evaluation (Nogatchewsky, 2009). Håkansson and Lind (2004) illustrate, with the example of Ericsson and Telia Mobile, an inter-organizational structure combining hierarchical coordination, market and cooperation modalities. eTh y thus show how the administrative ele - ments of control contribute to the IORs by structuring the coordination moda- lities. Referring indirectly to this element of control when referring to MCSs standards and procedures, Vélez et al. (2008) show that they can strengthen pre-existing bonds of trust between organizations. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 8 1.2.2. INSTRUMENTAL ELEMENTS FOR IORS: PLANNING, CYBERNETICS, AND REWARDS Malmi and Brown have aggregated the “planning”, “cybernetics” and “reward” elements at the core of their model. Since it is the instruments of mana- gement control that are referred to , here we have grouped them together and labeled them as “instrumental elements of control”. “Planning” refers to the organization's goals and standards for aligning the operational level with the strategy. At the inter-organizational level, it corres- ponds to the common objectives of the organizations. Mediating between orga- nizational objectives that respond to multiple, and sometimes divergent interests (Kickert et al., 1997), this element contributes to the alignment of major policy orientations with daily actions (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011). eTh se authors show that the objectives of inter-organizational cooperation in a reform of the health and social care sector in England have led to hybrid forms of partnership that respond to both regulatory injunction and organizational initiative. e Th “cybernetics” element consists of measuring and defining targets and standards to compare, analyze gaps and take corrective action (Malmi & Brown, 2008). Since the creation of the IORs, in response to the need to introduce monitoring (Mouritsen et al., 2001), this element has helped in the selection of partners, the formation of contracts (Ding et al., 2013) and the development of IORs (Håkansson & Lind, 2004). When the relationship is established, it formally frames the action. By reducing information asymmetry between orga- nizations (Tomkins, 2001; Mouritsen et al., 2001; Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), it is mobilized to manage risk within the RIO (Willis et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2016). Allowing organizations to identify the most effective and least costly solutions (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), it is a basis for negotiation (Dekker, 2003). e Th cybernetic element also plays a role in the management of interac - tions between organizations. Supporting coordination and cooperation among teams and between organizations (Dekker, 2003; Mahama, 2006; Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006; Barretta & Busco, 2011), it supports the self-regulation and orchestration mechanisms of IORs (Mouritsen et al. 2001; Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006). Taking the example of networked firms, Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) show that transfer pricing between organizations simpliefi s and clariefi s their relationships but, at the same time, reveals their divergent interests. This speci - cfi ally occurs when organizations agree on how to calculate transfer prices, ten - sions rise but are overcome to protect the relationships and exchanges between 5. They refer to the instruments of management control, from the definition of objec - tives to the evaluation of organizational processes and the measurement of their per- formance. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 9 organizations. As Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) state, “e Th dicffi ulty in calcula - ting the costs was a concern, but there was a strong attempt to not make detailed cost calculation a big issue because it was more important that the system of costs and transfer prices helped interaction to increase than to make transfer prices authentic” (p. 257). e Th third instrumental element of the MCSs, “reward”, refers to the tools for recognition/reward for achieving objectives and for sanctioning failure to do so. As a lever for adherence in an inter-organizational change framework (Carlsson- Wall et al., 2011), this element contributes to the sustainability and predictability of the IORs (Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006) if it is adjusted to the effort that each organization brings to the relationship. 1.2.3. THE CULTUR AL ELEMENT OF CONTROL FOR IORS e Th values, beliefs and social norms that inufl ence employee behavior are the cultural elements of control (Malmi & Brown, 2008). Based on intra-organiza- tional values, these elements inufl ence cooperation within IORs (Carlsson-Wall et al., 2011), due to their facilitating aspect of socialization processes (Mahama, 2006) combined with their potential to support partner vigilance (Kraus, 2012). As part of their study of the deployment of reform in the social sector in England, Kominis and Dubau (2012) discuss these links between control, values and IORs. eTh y show that the shift from “child protection” to “child safeguar - ding” signals a “paradigm shift in core organizational values” (p. 149) that has an impact on the relationships between the agencies responsible for this public service mission. e Th number of actors involved is signicfi antly increased, posing an additional challenge for their collaboration. Essential for trust-building mechanisms among IORs partners (e.g., Vélez et al., 2008), these elements can help balance control and innovation (Karmeni et al., 2017). Table 2 summarizes the control elements mobilized by the authors mentioned above. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 10 Table 2: Control Elements for IORs - Summary of Literature Expected phases and effects on the IORs Definition and Creation of the management of Management of the interaction IOR mechanisms and within the IOR practices Administrative Contributes to the Contributes to Element initial coordina- coordination Participates in trust-building tion mechanisms mechanisms mechanisms (Vélez et al., 2008). (Håkansson & (Håkansson & Lind, 2004). Lind, 2004). Formalizes IORs Links strategic Participates in trust-building and improves policies to day- mechanisms (Vélez et al., 2008). target definition to-day actions Provides support for the align- (Vélez et al., (Kurunmaki & ment of changing and divergent 2008). Miller, 2011). interests (Kickert et al., 1997). Improves orchestration mecha- nisms (Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006). Meets the need to Promotes coordination (Cooper introduce control Defines manage- & Slagmulder; 2004; Mahama, (Mouritsen et al., rial mechanisms 2006; Mouritsen & Thrane, Instru- 2001). and practices 2006). mental Assistance in (Tomkins, 2001). Represents each organization elements partner selection Improves (Mouritsen et al., 2001). of control (Ding et al., 2013). self-regulation Avoids information asymmetry Promotes relation- mechanisms (Tomkins, 2001; Mouritsen et ship development (Mouritsen & al., 2001; Cooper & Slagmulder, (Håkansson & Thrane, 2006). 2004). Lind, 2004). Avoids risk (Willis et al., 2014; Anderson et al. (2016). Is a basis for negotiation (Dek- ker, 2003). Enhances the sustainability and predictability of the IORs (Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006). Cultural Element Promotes balance Helps the coordinator to between control monitor the RIO (Marques et and innovation Plays a role al., 2011). (Karmeni et al., in monitoring Improves socialization processes 2017). partner organi- (Mahama, 2006). Changes the zations (Kraus, Influences involvement in number of stake- 2012). cooperation through intra-orga- holders (Kominis nizational culture (Carlsson-Wall & Dubau, 2012). et al., 2011). COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 Elements of the MCS Reward Cybernetic Planning 11 2. Research Design e Th purpose of this section is to clarify the issues of inter-organizational control in the case studied and to detail the data collection and analysis process. 2.1. Research Context Every year in France, 63.2 billion euros of public funds are allocated to sup- port the millions of direct benecfi iaries of health and social care facilities and ser - vices (HSCFSs). eTh se organizations provide support for the 4.6 million people with some form of disability and the 1.3 million dependent elderly people, i.e., 8% of the over-60s. By 2030, 20% of the population will be over 60 years old, and the proportion of those 75 years old and over is expected to double by 2070. oTh se in charge of these structures must face many challenges, including increa - sing demand, a slight increase in public funds, changes in pricing methods and intensiefi d quality and compliance requirements. Among these challenges, the focus on the person being cared for, as illustrated by the “Ma Santé 2022” pro- ject, is of particular importance, since it requires HSCFSs to forge stronger rela- tionships among themselves (cooperation, collaboration, coordination), known as inter-organizational relationships (IORs) at the time. This movement is accen - tuated by a process of grouping structures initiated by the public authorities, in particular, which also changes the nature of the IORs between the HSCFSs. In this context, the study of IORs between institutions and HSCFSs is of renewed interest. e Th IORs within the health and social care sector are part of a singular cultural context inherited from the history of the constitution of the sector. e Th HSCFSs are the offspring of charitable organizations, whether religious or not, or private initiatives, such as parents who do not have a solution for a support system for their handicapped child. HSCFSs have focused on support and care, and orga- nizational processes are dominated by oral communication, weak formalization of processes and a culture away from formal control (Tucker & Parker, 2013). In the context of current changes in the sector, a management instrumentation has been developed (Lemaire & Nobre, 2014; Lux, 2016). Aimed at optimizing resources at a time when the number of people receiving support is constantly increasing (Kominis & Dudau, 2012), one of the MCSs implemented is a dash- board common to the entire sector, known as the “performance management dashboard for the health and social care sector”. Divided into four areas – profiles and support of people, human and material resources, finances and objectives in terms of information systems and quality – the indicators in the dashboard are broken down into three levels of analysis: COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 12 dialogue with the pricing authorities, internal management and benchmarking with similar structures. Being a device with procedures deployed by pricing authorities to inufl ence HSCFSs according to predefined objectives, this dashboard is effectively an MCS, according to the criteria of Das and Teng, (1998), Dekker (2004) and Marques et al. (2011). In this project, the national performance support agency, acting as a state consultant, was mandated by the national regulatory authorities to design and introduce this tool for the HSCFSs. Implemented in organizations that accepted voluntarily to participate to the experiment, the tool was deployed for many structures that link IORs that we observed. 2.2. Data Collection and Analysis Aiming to understand the effects of MCSs on the IORs, we adopted an abductive approach of grounded theorizing that involves a presence in the research efi ld (Joannidès & Berland, 2008). In order to observe a complete cycle of dashboard entry (construction of the tool including different actors, data entry by the HSCFSs and use of the indicators that emerge from it), we collected data over an 18-month period , beginning with the involvement of the ARS (regional health agency) concerned in the project to introduce the dashboard. e Th data collection methods are detailed in Table 3. In addition to gathering all docu- ments related to the project, observation-based data were collected in research notes detailing the events, the actors involved, the dynamics of interactions and the opinions expressed by the actors during the interviews. We were in a position of participant-observer at every meeting related to the project and every dash- board training meeting. Indeed, the ninety-four HSCFSs involved in the project were trained in the dashboard to understand the issues and how to use the tool. During these trainings, we observed and collected data. In addition, interviews were conducted with the managers of sixty-six HSCFSs, i.e., more than seventy percent of the HSCFSs included in the project. 6. The research project lasted six years, but this article builds on the first eighteen months. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 13 Table 3: Data Collection 250 days / 18 months Involvement in the research context 400 pages of note-taking Official presentation documents Document collection - 1000 pages Internal documents around the project of presentations Newspaper articles and other publications 5 formal presentations of the project 5 formal project steering meetings Meetings - 35 over the 18 months 16 internal steering follow-up meetings at ARS 5 formal meetings external to ARS 5 formal meetings within ARS 22 seniors' care home facilities 2 services for seniors 21 facilities for adults with disabilities Heads of 66 HSCFSs 12 establishments for disabled children Interviews 5 services for adults with disabilities 4 services for disabled children Number of hours 65 hours of formal interviews of recording Number of pages transcribed 800 pages Data collection is based on a efi ld study in accordance with the proposals of Glaser and Strauss (1967), combined with interviews and secondary data. We processed the data from the interviews that we transcribed, as well as internal documents and presentations and notes from the research journal following an identical protocol for these materials, in order to avoid bias from the interviewees and to have a global view (Modell, 2003). This processing consisted of coding that followed several steps. To code the collected data, we used the Nvivo software. First, we created a project and then we defined the attributes of the interviews. eTh se attri - butes concerned (i) the type of organizations concerned by the source coded: HSCFSs=IORs organization, National Performance Support Agency=dashboard designer, Regional Health Agency or Departmental Council=local pricing authority, General Directorate for Social Cohesion (Direction Générale de la Cohésion Sociale) =national regulatory authority; (ii) the type of data source: interview, observation, formal meeting, informal meeting, presentation; (iii and following) the characteristics of the organization: size, legal structures, number of employees, etc. eTh n, we imported the sources into the project and speciefi d the attributes of each source. This step of describing the sources allowed us to process the collec - ted information with reference to the intrinsic characteristics of the data. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 14 e Th next step was to code each of the sources. For this, we employed Charmaz's (2014) proposal of a three-step coding according to the work of Gioia (e.g., Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). First of all, we proceeded to label the raw data, summarizing their content through a synthetic code called first-order code. Over the course of the readings that fed the coding of existing concepts we modiefi d these codes to integrate the conceptual dimension. According to Joannidès and Berland (2008), “Coding is done in an abductive way by successive iterations and progressive groupings” (p.145). uTh s, coding is renewed, refined by the concepts and adapted to the theoretical framework in order to arrive at a structured corpus favoring the ana- lysis of the subject studied. e Th second stage of coding consisted of linking first- order codes to bring out the main recurrences in the analysis. This is the axial coding phase which leads to the formalization of categories. In a third stage, the accumulation of these categories led to the emergence of themes, which brought together the key ideas of the data and allowed a synthetic understanding of the mechanisms studied. During each of these stages, the elaboration of memos pro- moted conceptualization. In the case studied, the coding process allowed the identicfi ation of elements used by the organizations and to qualify their effects on the IORs. As an example, the following quote, “What I take away from this today is that it's for easier compa- rison. But it's a bit tricky because there are different types of establishments. We, for example, don't just have the care home facility, we also manage the hospital. There is re-invoicing, then we have to split the whole thing up, it's not easy. We make a distinction between care, dependency and accommodation. The split is done with dis- tribution keys but what happens afterwards?” was coded with the first order code “fear of hasty comparisons”. Using readings and confrontation with the rest of the corpus, by axial coding, we refined the coding while remaining close to the initial verbatim. e Th first-order code was now the following: “e Th benchmark induces a risk of hasty comparisons of disparate elements”. e Th results of the first- order codes were then analyzed to produce categories. e Th comparison with the other first-order codes, “e Th dashboard allows HSCFSs to compare their results with similar structures” and “e Th benchmark promotes the analysis of HSCFSs performance”, resulted in the categorization entitled, “A production of virtuous or early comparisons”. This category was then associated with the other two categories, “A clustering dynamic between cooperation and competition” and “A sanction/reward to ease differences”. This association of themes resulted in the emergence of a theme “e Th benchmark initiating instrumented cooperative IORs” summarizing the data that attested to the cooperative dynamics (Depeyre & Dumez, 2007) which was reinforced by the instrumental elements of control. Figure 1 illustrates data structure based on coding. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 15 Figure 1. Data structure 1st order codes Categories Themes - An initiation of contacts between the HSCFS 'handicap' and 'old age' HSCFS. A nascent IOR as a - A discovery of the other organizations in the sector result of the and their operating modes. introduction of the The - Exchanges during and at the end of the training MCS administrative courses on the tool. element with a - A recognition of the interdependence of HSCFS. relational and informal scope - An informal inter-organizational structure: informal governance; lack of hierarchical relationships. A low formalized - Formalization under construction: incipient IOR procedures; a policy of information sharing. - Visibility on the actions of other HSCFS, opening up opportunities for partnerships, regrouping and A dynamic of network development. partnership between - Increased competition among HSCFS with the cooperation and introduction of the MCS favoring some and competition undermining others. - The dashboard allows HSCFS to compare their The benchmark results with similar structures. initiating the A production of - Benchmarking promotes HSCFS performance instrumentation virtuous or early analysis of coopetitive comparisons - Benchmarking leads to a risk of hasty comparisons IOR of disparate elements. - A step towards the standardization of funding. - A questioning of the funding resulting from history. A sanction/reward - A sanction for the most funded structures. to ease differences - A reward for the less funded. - Experiments making the HSCFS actors in the A participatory transformation of the tool (design / expression of approach to difficulties / modifications of the dashboard). disseminate a new - A tool for disseminating a definition of performance The cultural vision of based on efficiency, optimization based on quantified element, a tool performance results. for a new performance amplifying ambivalence in IORs - A use of MCS for collective bargaining purposes . Opposite effects on - Use of the results of the dashboard to show the IORs specificities of the structures, and to put them in competition with each other. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 16 This coding of the data led to the structuring of the results which are the subject of the following section. 3. Results e Th results show how each of the elements of the MCS contributed to the construction of the IORs in the case studied of the introduction of the dash- board in the health and social care sector. 3.1. The Administrative Element with Relational and Informal Scope for the IORs By reconfiguring their exchanges around the first tool common to the whole sector, the introduction of the dashboard encourages the initiation of rela- tions between the HSCFSs of the “older” (EHPAD/ care home facilities) and “disabled” sectors: “It's a rather global tool, which will allow all [HSCFSs], both the care home facility and the establishments for disabled people... to work with the same tools. It's logical because we all have the same objective, to support vulnerable people” (Director of a care home facility) and “It can make us feel like we belong to something, a larger set...” (Head of a disabled HSCFS). eTh se new relationships are possible thanks to the dashboard trainings that are part of the administrative element of control. eTh se trainings during the introduction process of the dashboard, bring together managers of facilities for elderly and disabled people. eTh y are administrative elements of control because they constitute a procedure that contributes to the definition of tasks and pro - cesses (Malmi & Brown, 2008) that formalize the coordination links between the actors involved in the IORs (Håkansson & Lind, 2004). By bringing about fifteen people present at each of the ten sessions organized for the region to meet and exchange during the sessions and breaks, these days were an opportunity to create new relationships. For example, in one of the departments, care home facilities’ directors met regularly to discuss their common problems. e Th introduction of the MCS had two effects: the first was the inclusion on the agenda of feedback on practices related to the dashboard, while the second was the invitation of structures that accompany people with disabilities to these meetings. Discovering their respective modes of operation, HSCFSs managers identi- efi d the similarity of some of their concerns, particularly in terms of manage - ment, and expanded their networks. Subsequently, when entering the data for calculating the indicators on the web platform dedicated to the tool, they deve- loped tools for sharing information via the ocffi ial project forum, but above all COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 17 via unocffi ial channels, to facilitate their understanding of the work expected by the authorities. By multiplying their exchanges in this way, the HSCFSs have become aware of their interdependence. However, these nascent IORs remain little formalized: they do not have a dedicated structure and governance is informal. While some HSCFSs initiate actions and can be considered as leaders, no hierarchy is associated with these IORs focused on information sharing. uTh s, the administrative element does not allow for the structuring of cooperation that has been observed in other cases (Håkansson & Lind, 2004). e Th administrative element, which creates a new interaction between organizations but does not structure the exchanges, favors an informal IOR. 3.2. The Benchmark Initiating the Instrumentation of Cooperative IORs e Th instrumental dimension of the MCS includes goal setting (planning), formal tools for control (cybernetics) and sanctions/rewards (see section 1). Structured around cooperation, partnerships, pooling, but also competition between structures, the relational dynamics between HSCFSs, which are coope- rative, are reinforced by the instrumental elements of the MCS - groupings, logic of comparison and standardization. A DYNAMIC OF GROUPINGS BETWEEN COOPER ATION AND COMPETITION “Planning” control involves the formalization of objectives and standards and allows for the compatibility of the objectives of dieff rent organizations (Kickert et al., 1997). Applied to the dashboard, this element of control refers to the dynamics of current groupings. eTh introduction of the MCS is taking place in a context of mergers, acqui - sitions, pooling… which are, on the one hand, encouraged by the public authorities 7. The public authorities had announced the intention to regroup the 36,000 struc - tures into 6,000 in the Blanc report of 2005. In addition to this announcement, the authorization and approval procedure for HSCFSs has been changed. Indeed, earlier, HSCFSs proposed to open up structures, space, changes, etc. and the pricing authori- ties validated certain proposals. Then a new procedure consisting of the issuing by the pricing authorities of calls for projects to which the HSCFSs had to respond. This call for projects procedure favored structures that had the capacity to respond, favoring HSCFSs that already had internal skills or existing partnerships. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 18 and, on the other, initiated by the HSCFSs themselves . Asking HSCFSs about their pooling and partnerships, indicators in the dash- board highlight the importance of the objective of grouping together. By using the tool, they can situate their own results in relation to those of similar struc- tures within a chosen geographical perimeter, identify areas of complementarity and thus select future partners: “The survey was interesting. It allows us to see the diversity of practices and all the forms of collaboration and partnership that can be put in place” (Coordinating physician of an HSCFS). Evaluating the achievement of collaborative work objectives, the indicators help to respond to government injunctions: “One of the specificities of ITEP [therapeutic, educational and peda- gogical institutes], through the law that defines them, is interdisciplinarity. So I think it would be interesting to measure it, in times of interdisciplinarity, or to des- cribe the contents in order to be able to measure and to have a comparison, in relation to other colleagues” (Director of an HSCFS). By identifying activities, the dashboard facilitates the identicfi ation of exper - tise specic fi to HSCFSs and complementary to that of hospitals, thus further opening up IORs opportunities: “I think that this whole hospital part, which is shaped by the health culture, can benefit from our own know-how and, conversely, I think that for our care part, we will benefit from the experience and know-how of the health sector” (Head of an HSCFS). Considered by some to be advantageous, these partnership opportuni- ties make it possible to combat compartmentalization and develop HSCFSs networks: “Today, I think that at the health and social care level, everyone stays a little in their own dungeon. It's a shame not to share knowledge and opportunities. I was also expecting this from the ANAP [national performance support agency] project, and it was a discovery” (Head of an HSCFS). This dynamic of groupings, which creates competition between HSCFSs, weakens those who do not have the necessary resources to propose or participate in partnerships: “There is a phenomenon that happens. It is competition. And the [possible modifications in terms of ] financing, these are two elements that trigger the mobilization of the leaders of these structures to adapt to the environment” (Head of the information systems of an association). 8. The latter may take the form of providing facilities (a laundry for example) or selling services, such as the distribution in an institution for elderly dependent people of meals prepared by people with disabilities working in care and work support facilities. Partnerships may also concern support expertise specific to health and social care structures (socio-educational support practices for specific disabilities, implementa - tion of benevolent dynamics in teams and vis-à-vis users, etc.). COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 19 This dicffi ulty of adaptation is accentuated for isolated HSCFSs: “It's difficult for [large] institutions. [It is] even more so for an isolated institution. It's impossible, so that means that it all goes in the same direction. The small institutions don't have the possibility to face the new challenges... or at what cost? They would have to be able to afford consultants. ... Well, it's just not possible. They don't have the means. So these institutions alone have no future” (Head of an association). Unable to cope with the changes in the environment, some structures disap- pear. In short, the control planning element inufl ences the IORs by accentuating the reconciliation logics, which can be at the source of the strengthening or weakening of HSCFSs. A PRODUCTION OF VIRTUOUS OR HASTY COMPARISONS Among the instrumental elements, those described as “cybernetics” are used to improve decision making through the production of numbers, benchmarks and gap analysis (Malmi & Brown, 2008). Introducing this dimension of com- parison based on numerical measures, the HSCFSs benchmark is a novelty for the sector: “That's what I found interesting. I think that we are making progress in comparing ourselves. And this is something that is not very well developed in the health and social care field” (Head of an HSCFS). According to some interviewees, it promotes transparency and objectivity, and the calculation of variances helps in the analysis of performance: “The goal is not to interfere with the data of each establishment, but at least to have averages, objective things, anonymized data... but at least objective and calculated on the same basis” (Head of an HSCFS). “It's interesting to compare ourselves. It's a bit stimulating. [...] We can reflect on averages, on this typical structure, this type of service, this type of service. We have this price for the day” (Head of an HSCFS). Stressing the singularity of each structure and the risk of hasty comparisons of disparate data, others deplore the introduction of the benchmark, showing that differences in the treatment of accounting information call its interest into question: “What I take away from this today is that it's for easier comparison. But it's a bit tricky because there are different types of establishments. We, for example, don't just have the care home facility, we also manage the hospital. There is re-invoicing, then we have to split the whole thing up, it's not easy. We make a distinction between care, dependency and accommodation. The split is done with distribution keys but what happens afterwards?” (Financial manager of an HSCFS). Decontextualized comparisons can lead to bad decisions, as evoked by this manager who has experienced the closure of a structure justiefi d by comparisons that he considers hasty. Based on this experience, he questions the relevance of the benchmark: “When we realize that everyone is doing something on their own, COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 20 it even raises the question of the relevance of the partner's choices. We realize that the differences between the figures they ask us for show [that the partners, especially the funders] have not always perceived, understood the reality of our institutions. Data that is not always relevant, for example, the management of working time, absenteeism and vacations, in an institution that operates seven days a week, 24 hours a day, does not have the same constraints and challenges as a structure that operates five days a week” (Head of an HSCFS). Evoking the peculiarities of the structures in terms of governance, support, information processing, geographical or historical context, these criticisms call into question the ability of numerical data to faithfully reefl ct the reality of HSCFSs. A SANCTION/AWARD TO EASE DIFFERENCES OR TO FIGHT ABOUT FUNDING Aiming at motivation and performance improvement, the “reward” ele- ment (Malmi & Brown, 2008) of the scorecard refers to the standardization of HSCFSs fees to achieve relative equity: “[One of the objectives of the pricing authorities is to] know the existing offer in order to ensure the best match between needs and supply, the adequacy between people's situations and their support and care structure(s), and to ensure equity of funding” (Extract from the ocffi ial presentation of the project launch). Resulting from calculations that take into account multiple variables, the allocation received by each HSCFS is unique . e Th degree of enthusiasm for the intention to ease differences in tariffs depends on the perception of the HSCFSs' staff about the funding. Some HSCFSs are considered “under-funded” by their managers, as they receive less funding than their peers. e Th latter positively assess this intention of equity and intend to use the indicators in the dashboard in their negotiations with the authorities. 9. This objective of equity is particularly delicate in the health and social care field, each situation being specific and many variables relating to HSCFS resources need to be considered (geographical location, financial stability, degree of dependence on public funding, etc.). Furthermore, the needs of users are not uniform, the nomenclatures of these needs are still being developed and the updating of data on the degree of autonomy of the people cared for implies a delay that is incompatible with the esta- blishment of adequate funding in real time. For example, a certified doctor must validate a dependency score of the elderly people cared for in the care home facilities, but regional resources do not allow this score to be updated frequently enough to correspond to the reality of the structures. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 21 eTh se HSCFSs managers point out the injustices of treatment: they denounce ocffi ial dependency scores that do not reefl ct reality, highlight changes in the profiles of the people they care for, deplore recruitment needs that are not met because of their geographical location, or refer to decisions rooted in a political environment that was not favorable to them: “Beyond the needs, this will undoub- tedly become a pricing tool. Unlike many of my colleagues, I'm in favor of it because the institutions' funding is the result of history. People have been able to demand, have been able to ask, have been able to get funded. People like us, who have never been... we've always managed well, we've never asked for too much, we've never asked for overbilling, and so we're not extremely well funded. At some point in time, for the same service, [...] we should have the same funding to do the same things” (Head of an HSCFS). “And it's a service that is traditionally, too bad I'm going to say it, under-funded. It seemed important to be able to objectify it. To have factual, objective elements. It's a way of showing what you're doing ... it's not necessarily what was in the [health and social care organization] file at the beginning. The profiles evolve. The people who have chronic diseases, there is a greater demand for care, while the ARS grants us a percentage increase per year. Which it not taken into account is the reality on the ground” (Head of an HSCFS). On the other hand, HSCFSs for which easing of rates means a decrease in allocations justify the existence of these differences in treatment by the specicfi i - ties of their situation and the history of the organizations: “After that, the question arises; what's the point of comparing? This will give us an idea...I know that budget rationalization means wanting ‘to put everyone in the same boat’. The idea of equity between services is not without interest. At the same time, what is interesting are the reasons why the sector has been built this way, with extreme diversity, and it is also the richness of the sector” (Head of an HSCFS). e Th reward dimension of the “under-funded” becomes sanctioned from the point of view of the “over-funded”. Participating in the formalization of the IORs without inducing an associated valence, the instrumental elements of the MCS produce ambivalence in the relations between the organizations of the sector. 3.3. The Cultural Element, a Tool for a New Performance Amplifying Ambivalence in IORs Rooted in a militant commitment to the inclusion of vulnerable people, the values of the health and social care sector are carried by associations formed in a participatory logic. Based on this culture, the project leader for the introduction of the dashboard develops a coherent dynamic to encourage the mobilization of the actors in the project. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 22 In addition to the participation of some in the initial design of the tool, all HSCFSs can point out inconsistencies or dicffi ulties, i.e., express themselves on the relevance and reliability of indicators, input methods, the ergonomics of the tool, etc. e Th experimenters contributed to the changes made to the dashboard through comments they made on the platform and so-called “capitalization” meetings at the end of the data entry periods aimed at improving the tool for subsequent campaigns. This opportunity to express oneself is new for a project emanating from public authorities, It aims to make HSCFSs actors of transformation: “It's always more interesting to be in the exchange, and even more so in these trainings. We can ask questions... all the questions and then, on the other hand, we can have this zone too. I don't mean influence, but we can bring up certain information, by this meeting with you today, or by the feedback we will get. It allows us to really enter into the process and not to undergo it as we undergo all the surveys” (Head of an HSCFS). e Th project manager relies on this participative dimension to spread a new performance culture in the sector based on quantiefi d results, process ecffi iency and resource optimization. For some actors, this evolution is desirable: “We need to move to a cultural model, which is that of efficiency and to use modern tools, inter- net tools ... And that it is generalized, so that it is useful”. For others, this change of culture is violent and undesirable: “And so there is a clash, especially of culture. Because for them it's the objective, the numbers, the things, and on the other side you have people for whom it's important to know, wait, we're in the individual project... [...] that's also going to shed some light on the numbers in a certain way” (Head of an HSCFS). By conveying a new conception of performance, the cultural element reveals the relationship that organizations have with the MCS. eTh se relationships toward the MCS are reefl cted on the IORs in two opposite directions. On the one hand, the HSCFSs have triggered cooperative collective action within the IORs. When the managers exchanged around their indicators, they shared also about their practices of dialogue with the pricing authorities. eTh se exchanges led them to better understand the expectations, logic and operating methods of the authorities and ultimately to increase the HSCFSs' capacity for action. 10. Article 18 of the HPST law specifies the objectives of the agency that carries the project: “The national performance support agency aims to help health and social care institutions to improve the service provided to patients and users, by developing and disseminating recommendations and tools whose implementation it monitors, enabling them to modernize their management, optimize their real estate assets and monitor and increase their performance, in order to control their spending.” COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 23 On the other hand, some associations participate in the dashboard imple- mentation project to promote their audiences over others, thus developing com- petition between organizations. Being insucffi iently represented at the local level, institutions for people with disabilities have organized a national meeting, com- pared their indicator results with other categories of facilities and built argu- ments on this basis to defend their specic c fi ause with national institutions. For some managers, consultation between HSCFSs is urgent; it is a matter of getting together to plead the cause of specic fi audiences: “One risk is that we won't be able to get our audience to come forward, I'm afraid it's going to hurt the disability sector. We really need to ‘get around the table’ [to meet] and talk about that” (Head of an HSCFS - physical disability). Reactivating the organizations' own values, the cultural element accentuates the collectively ambivalent relationship that organizations have with the tool, ultimately amplifying the ambivalence of the IORs. 4. Discussion e Th research results show that the introduction of a MCS contributes to the construction of IORs by initiating the relationships, formalizing them and pro- jecting the relationship that organizations have with the performance perception that it entails. In the health and social care sector, the administrative element of the dashboard has made it possible to establish relationships between organi- zations, but these have remained informal. eTh ir formalization, ensured by the instrumental elements, have led to relations that were simultaneously cooperative and competitive. Accentuating this ambivalence in the IORs, the cultural ele- ment reveals the relationship that each organization has with the MCS and the definition of performance that it conveys. 4.1. Ambivalent IORs e Th introduction of the MCS in the health and social care sector, which conveys and formalizes new elements of control, has changed the relationships between organizations in an ambivalent dynamic reefl cting “a simultaneously positive and negative orientation towards an object” (Ashforth et al., 2014, p. 1454). Initiating new relationships between organizations that take care of the elderly and people with disabilities, the procedure for introducing the tool, an administrative element of control, has had a relational and informal impact. Reinforcing a dynamic of cooperation (Depeyre & Dumez, 2007) already exis- ting in the sector, the benchmark has initiated its instrumentation, making it more meaningful and concrete and ultimately more central in the IORs. Diffusing a COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 24 new definition of performance, the cultural element is both an institutional tool and a lever of action for HSCFSs that reactivate their militant values. Identifying the ambivalent effect of each of these control elements, the research findings complement the literature on the effects of MCSs on IORs. While some critical studies address the adverse effects of control on IORs, and others adopt a positive stance towards these effects, our research allows us to question these exclusive postures and to propose a more inclusive reading. First of all, the inter-organizational ambivalence induced by the instrumen- tal element of planning is indicative of intra-organizational strategies (Carlsson- Wall et al., 2016). By conveying the inter-organizational objective of grouping HSCFSs, the dashboard indicators prefigure either the growth or the weakening of organizations within the IORs. oTh se that have already been part of this dyna - mic have been confirmed in their choice, while the others are being questioned. Confirming that the strategic approach of the MCSs is the result of a combina - tion of adaptations to the context (Langefi ld-Smith, 1997) and an organizational orientation reefl cting singular positioning (Chenhall, 2003), the strategy of the HSCFSs combines their own choices and those induced by the public authori- ties. Referring to Kurunmäki and Miller (2011), for whom control can lead to the hybridization of partnerships (partly imposed and partly chosen by orga- nizations), our results highlight the opposing and simultaneous impacts of the MCSs objectives. e Th dashboard translates policy decisions into management practices (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011). However, HSCFSs will not necessarily align their strategies with these formal expectations, some preferring to proceed with decoupling practices (Tucker & Parker, 2015) between formal reporting and informal monitoring practices. Confirming the plurality of strategic positio - ning of HSCFSs (Lux, 2016; Lemaire, 2020), the identicfi ation of ambivalence reveals them and highlights the impact of these choices for organizations. Secondly, the results show an unexpected effect of the administrative compo - nent. Creating new relational dynamics, this element does not formally structure IORs. Having little effect on formal coordination processes (Håkansson & Lind, 2004) and promoting informality and interpersonal skills, the administrative element has a counter-intuitive impact on the IORs. Echoing the “transactio- nal/relational” distinction (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2009), this result confirms that transactional control can also have communicational and relational effects, mixing formal and informal controls (Nogatchewsky, 2009). Acting as a fra- mework, organizational structure can facilitate or inhibit interactions between actors and between organizations (Sebti et al., 2015). e Th encounters fostered by the tool's introduction procedure are points of contact for relationships that were then able to develop, certainly because they remained informal. Finally, the emergence of tensions induced by MCSs on the IORs (Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006) is explained by the ambivalence of their effects. By highlighting COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 25 the disparity in HSCFSs funding and allowing for numerical comparisons, the dashboard has been able to fuel existing tensions. Potentially creative if their impacts are balanced (Mundy, 2010), these tensions between organizations are also fueled by the testing of the sector's values. Confirming that the introduction of control can lead to a redefinition of fundamental values (Kraus, 2012), the results show that a (militant) value can be both used to mobilize actors around a project (participatory approach) and made obsolete by the same project (dissemi- nation of institutional performance). If tensions between values can promote the successful implementation of control tools in the public (Dreveton, 2017), it is also necessary to question the finality pursued by the devices. 4.2. The Purpose of Control Fueled by Ambivalence Composed of a symbolic corpus, the constitution of a collective organization and a system of technical communication (Debray, 1991), MCSs are not neutral (Rose & Miller, 1992; Bracci et al., 2015). eTh se media convey a definition of performance unfamiliar to certain sectors (Tucker & Parker, 2013; Järvinen, 2016), such as the health and social care sector (Loubat, 2012), while at the same time giving them new arguments (Burchell et al., 1980). e Th introduction of performance indicators guides organizations towards a market logic (Audier, 2012) and makes them hybrid (Miller et al., 2008). Including the notions of competition (Seal, 1999) and optimization based on quantiefi d results (Tucker & Parker, 2013), MCSs are vectors of “ manageriali- zation” (Kurunmäki, 2009) and “accountingization” (Kraus, 2012). Our results show how the antagonistic forces inherent in MCSs (Bouquin & Kuszla, 2013) have ambivalent effects that are part of this movement. With simultaneously opposing effects, MCSs have a scope and power that is accentuated. e Th ambiva - lence of MCS effects makes it acceptable, unavoidable and indisputable. Fostering not only competition, but also cooperation, the benchmark becomes acceptable. Considered in isolation, competition can be judged negatively by the actors; but juxtaposed with cooperation, it is tinged with its own virtues. Indeed, cooperation allows organizations to evolve towards greater efl xibility in a win-win dynamic, as shown by Carlsson-Wall et al. (2011) in the case of the sector providing care for the elderly. e Th resulting cooperation makes it possible to give the best, to avoid staying alone, to counteract prior agreements on fares (which could be unfavorable for users) or to prevent excessive self-centering of the structure. This juxtaposition of opposite effects protects part of the existing representations of the actors - cooperation is virtuous - making the part less easily acceptable to them - competition - more attractive. uTh s, in a process similar to the one described by Dambrin and Robson (2011) when they analyzed COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 26 the evolution of the identities of salespeople in the pharmaceutical sector with the introduction of control, the simultaneity of opposing injunctions (sell and inform in their case) makes them acceptable. e Th coexistence of positive and negative impacts regarding the easing of tari ff or the dynamics of HSCFSs groupings also allows public authorities to com- municate selectively. By relying on the positive remarks of the managers who expressed themselves during the experiments, they strengthened the credibility of the project. In addition, relying not only on top-down communication (from public authorities to HSCFSs) but also on the sharing of information between peers, the dissemination of the tool is all the more effective when it is based on inter-organizational relationships. e Th dashboard has gradually become an obvious and commonly accepted tool (Lemaire, 2020). In fact, after an initial phase, during which filling in the dashboard was optional, the indicators gra - dually became mandatory; then part of the HSCFSs funding was based on their results to be integrated into contracts of objectives and means. uTh s, in a discreet and progressive manner, and under the cover of a consensus on the need to set it up, the scorecard gradually became an essential tool. Giving the illusion of preserving the militant values of the players by invol- ving them, the project manager ensured interaction between the players in the sector, and thus secured the translation of the performance tools (Leotta & Ruggeri, 2017). Co-construction with the actors (HSCFSs, associations repre- senting HSCFSs, users and families, local and national public authorities) contri- butes to its legitimization and prevents any opposition (Dambrin and Lambert, 2017). By relying on these ambivalent mechanisms, the SCG has thus become indisputable. Conclusion Aimed at highlighting the role of MCSs in the construction of IORs, this article shows that each of the control elements participates in this dynamic. In the case studied, the administrative element has made it possible to initiate IORs, which have been formalized by the instrumental elements. e Th cultural element exacerbated the ambivalent relationship that the actors had with the tool and projected this ambivalence onto the IORs. By conveying a conception of perfor- mance focused on the search for ecffi iency and optimization based on numeri - cal results, the MCSs also participates in the “managerialization” (Kurunmäki, 2009) and “accountingization” (Kraus, 2012) of the health and social care sector. Contributing to the literature on the effects of MCSs on the IORs, our research shows that MCSs are not incidental and contribute concretely to sha- ping the IORs. By studying the case of an IOR involving multiple organizations, COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 27 and detailing the control elements of an MCS, the article offers a complementary reading to previous research. Revealing underlying intra-organizational dyna- mics, the MCS participates in the construction of IORs by projecting each orga- nization's relationship to control. Moreover, showing that the purpose of control is nourished by the ambivalent effects of MCSs on IORs, the article contributes to the literature on the introduction of competition and optimization based on numerical results in sectors that are uncommon to these practices (Tucker & Parker, 2013). e Th research highlights the mechanisms through which the MCS change values initially far removed from the culture of a sector, into acceptable, indisputable and inescapable values. e Th limitations of the study give perspectives for future research. One is lin - ked to the fact that the article does not take into account the evolution of the phenomenon observed over time. Based on a efi ld approach over several years, a subsequent study should opt for a longitudinal analysis (Dawson, 2019). This would make it possible, in particular, to verify whether or not ambivalence per- sists, both within the IORs and in the organizations' relations with the MCS. Another is related to the levels of analysis of the observed phenomenon. We have chosen to look at IORs and the research results attest to an intra-organiza- tional impact of the tool that should be studied in greater depth. In other words, it would be possible to identify, for example, the responses that managers make to the introduction of control systems from state agencies. e Th last is related to the context of the pandemic experienced at the time of writing. e Th inter-organizational relations linking not only the HSCFSs (hori - zontal relations) but also the pricing authorities (vertical relations) seem to have been disrupted; specic fi research should be carried out to understand whether this is really the case and according to which aspects. References Agndal, H., & Nilsson, U. (2010). Different open book accounting practices for dif - ferent purchasing strategies. Management Accounting Research, 21(3), 147-166. Agndal, H., & Nilsson, U. (2019). The fast and the furious: The role of entrainment in controlled inter-organizational relationship transformation. Management Accounting Research, 43, 15-28. Anderson, S.W., Dekker, H.C., & Van den Abbeele, A. (2016). Costly control: An exa- mination of the trade-off between control investments and residual risk in interfirm transactions. Management Science, 2049-2395. Audier, S. (19-) (2012). Neo-liberalisme(s): Une archéologie intellectuelle. Grasset. Barretta, A., & Busco, C. (2011). Technologies of government in public sector's networks: In search of cooperation through management control innovations. Management Accounting Research, 22(4), 211-219. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 28 Boland, R.J., Sharma, A.K., & Afonso, P.S. (2008). Designing management control in hybrid organizations: The role of path creation and morphogenesis. Accounting, Organizations & Society, 33(7/8), 899-914. Bouquin, H., & Kuszla, C. (2013). Le contrôle de gestion (10th edition). Presses Universitaires de France. Bracci, E., Humphrey, C., Moll, J., & Steccolini, I. (2015). Public sector accounting, accountability and austerity: More than balancing the books?. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 28(6), 878-908. Broadbent, J., & Laughlin, R. (2009). Performance management systems: A conceptual model. Management Accounting Research, 20(4), 283-295. Burchell, S., Clubb, C., Hopwood, A., Hughes, J., & Nahapiet, J. (1980). The roles of accounting in organizations and society. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 5(1), 5-27. Busco, C., Giovannoni, E., & Scapens, R.W. (2008). Managing the tensions in inte- grating global organizations: The role of performance management systems. Management Accounting Research, 19(2), 103-125. Busco, C., Riccaboni, A., & Scapens, R.W. (2006). Trust for accounting and accoun- ting for trust. Management Accounting Research, 17(1), 11-41. Caglio, A., & Ditillo, A. (2008). A review and discussion of management control in inter- firm relationships: Achievements and future directions. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(7-8), 865-898. Cäker, M., & Siverbo, S. (2011). Management control in public sector Joint Ventures. Management Accounting Research, 22(4), 330-348. Carlsson-Wall, M., Kraus, K., & Karlsson, L. (2017). Management control in pul- sating organizations-A multiple case study of popular culture events. Management Accounting Research, 35, 20-34. Carlsson-Wall, M., Kraus, K., & Lind J. (2011). The interdependencies of intra- and inter-organizational controls and work practices-The case of domestic care of the elderly. Management Accounting Research, 22(4), 313-329. Charmaz, K. (2014). Constructing grounded theory. Introducing Qualitative Methods series, SAGE Publications. Chenhall, R.H. (2003). Management control systems design within its organizational context: Findings from contingency-based research and directions for the future. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28,(2-3), 127-168. Cooper, R., & Slagmulder, R. (2004). Interorganizational cost management and relatio- nal context. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(1), 1-26. Dambrin, C., & Lambert, C. (2017). Beauty or not beauty: Making up the producer of popular culture. Management Accounting Research, 35, 35-46. Dambrin, C., & Robson, K. (2011). Tracing performance in the pharmaceuti- cal industry: Ambivalence, opacity and the performativity of flawed measures. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 36(7), 428-455. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 29 Das, T.K., & Teng, B.-S. (1998). Between trust and control: Developing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances. The Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 491- Dawson, P. (2019). Reshaping change: A processual perspective. Routledge. Debray, R. (1991). Cours de médiologie générale. Gallimard. Dekker, H.C. (2004). Control of inter-organizational relationships: Evidence on appro- priation concerns and coordination requirements. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(1), 27-49. Dekker, H.C. (2016). On the boundaries between intrafirm and interfirm management accounting research. Management Accounting Research, 31, 86-99. Dekker, H.C. (2008). Partner selection and governance design in interfirm relation - ships. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(7-8), 915-941. Dekker, H.C. (2003). Value chain analysis in interfirm relationships: a field study. Management Accounting Research, 14(1), 1-23. Dekker, H.C., Sakaguchi J., & Kawai, T. (2013). Beyond the contract: Managing risk in supply chain relations. Risk and Risk Management in Management Accounting and Control, 24(2), 122-139. Depeyre, C., & Dumez, H. (2007). Le role du client dans les strategies de coopétition. Revue Francaise de Gestion, 176 (7), 99-110. Ding, R., Dekker, H.C., & Groot, T. (2013). Risk, partner selection and contrac- tual control in interfirm relationships. Risk and Risk Management in Management Accounting and Control, 24(2), 140-155. Donada, C., Mothe, C., Nogatchewsky, G., & de Campos Ribeiro, G. (2019). The res - pective effects of virtues and inter-organizational management control systems on relationship quality and performance: Virtues win. Journal of Business Ethics, 154(1), 211-228. Donada, C.& Nogatchewsky, G. (2006). Vassal or lord buyers: How to exert mana- gement control in asymmetric interfirm transactional relationships? Management Accounting Research, 17(3), 259-287. Dumez, H. (2011). Faire une revue de littérature: pourquoi et comment? Le Libellio d’AEGIS, 7(2), 15-27. Elbashir, M.Z., Collier, P.A., & Sutton, S.G. (2011). The role of organizational absorp - tive capacity in strategic use of business intelligence to support integrated manage- ment control systems. Accounting Review, 86(1), 155-184. Ferreira, A., & Otley, D. (2009). The design and use of performance management sys - tems: An extended framework for analysis. Management Accounting Research, 20(4), 263-282. Forgues, B., Fréchet, M., & Josserand, E. (2006). Relations Interorganisationnelles. Revue Francaise de Gestion, 164(5) ,17-31. Gioia, D.A., & Chittipeddi, K. (1991). Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change initiation. Strategic Management Journal, 12(6), 433-448. Glaser, B.G. & Strauss, A.L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qua- litative research. Aldine Transaction. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 30 Goullet, C., & Meyssonnier, F. (2011). Franchising network control. Accounting Auditing Control (A AC), 17(1), 99-121. Håkansson, H., & Lind, J. (2004). Accounting and network coordination. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(1), 51-72. Hopwood, A.G. (1996). Looking across rather than up and down: On the need to explore the lateral processing of information. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 21(6), 589-590. Järvinen, J.T. (2016). Role of management accounting in applying new institutional logics: A comparative case study in the non-prot fi sector. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 29(5), 861-886. Joannidès, V., & Berland, N. (2008). Grounded Theory: What uses in Management Accounting Research? Accounting Auditing Control (A AC), 14(3), 141-162. Karmeni, K., Villarmois, O. de L., & Mansouri, F. (2017). Control and Innovation: A study of the Mediating Effect of Knowledge Diffusion in Franchise Networks. Accounting Auditing Control (A AC), 23(3), 63-95. Kickert, W.J.M., Klijn, E.-H., & Koppenjan, J.F.M. (1997). Managing complex networks: Strategies for the public sector. SAGE Books. Kominis, G., & Dudau, A.I. (2012). Time for interactive control systems in the public sector? The case of the Every Child Matters policy change in England. Management Accounting Research, 23(2), 142-155. Kraus, K. (2012). Heterogeneous accountingisation: Accounting and inter-organi- zational cooperation in home care services. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 25(7), 1080-1112. Kurunmäki, L. (2009). Management accounting, economic reasoning and the new public management reforms. In C. S. Chapman, A. G. Hopwood, & M. D. Shields (éd), Handbooks of management accounting research. Elsevier, 1371-1383. Kurunmäki, L., & Miller, P. (2011). Regulatory hybrids: Partnerships, budgeting and modernising government. Management Accounting Research, 22(4), 220-241. Langfield-Smith, K. (1997). Management control systems and strategy: A critical review. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 22(2), 207-232. Langfield-Smith, K., & Smith, D. (2003). Management control systems and trust in outsourcing relationships. Management Accounting Research, 14(3), 281-307. Lemaire, C. (2020). Changing Perceptions of a Dashboard in the Health and Social Care Sector. Revue Finance, Contrôle, Stratégie, NS 10. Lemaire, C., & Nobre, T. (2014). Le rôle des acteurs dans la gestion d'un projet d'im- plantation d'un tableau de bord dans le secteur médico-social. Journal de Gestion et d'Economie Médicales, 32(7-8), 431-461. Leotta, A., Ruggeri, D. (2017). Performance measurement system innovations in hos- pitals as translation processes. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 30(4), 955-978. Loubat, J.-R. (2012). Performance et reprise en main de l'Etat : les raisons d'une obses- sion comptable. EMPAN, 87, 22-26. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 31 Lux, G. (2016). Les représentations de la performance des directeurs d’Etablissements et Services Médico-Sociaux. RIMHE: Revue Interdisciplinaire Management, Homme & Entreprise, 21(2), 46-68. Mahama, H. (2006). Management control systems, cooperation and performance in strategic supply relationships: A survey in the mines. Management Accounting Research, 17(3), 315-339. Malmi, T., & Brown, D.A. (2008). Management control systems as a package-oppor- tunities, challenges and research directions. Management Accounting Research, 19(4), 287-300. Marques, L., Ribeiro, J.A., & Scapens, R.W. (2011). The use of management control mechanisms by public organizations with a network coordination role: A case study in the port industry. Management Accounting Research, 22(4), 269-291. Miller, P., Kurunmäki L., & O'Leary, T. (2008). Accounting, hybrids and the manage- ment of risk. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(7-8), 942-967. Modell, S. (2003). Goals versus institutions: The development of performance measu - rement in the Swedish university sector. Management Accounting Research, 14(4), 333-359. Mouritsen, J., Hansen, A., & Hansen, C.Ø. (2001). Inter-organizational controls and organizational competencies: Episodes around target cost management/functional analysis and open book accounting. Management Accounting Research, 12(2), 221- Mouritsen, J., & Thrane, S. (2006). Accounting, network complementarities and the development of inter-organizational relations. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31(3), 241-275. Mundy, J. (2010). Creating dynamic tensions through a balanced use of management control systems. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 35(5), 499-523. Neu, D. (1991). Trust, contracting and the prospectus process. Accounting, Organizations & Society, 16(3), 243-256. Neumann, K. (2010). Ex ante governance decisions in inter-organizational relation- ships: A case study in the airline industry. Management Accounting Research, 21(4), 220-237. Nogatchewsky G. (2009). Contrôle inter-organisationnel. In B. Colasse, ed. Encyclopédie de comptabilité, contrôle de gestion et audit. : Paris : Economica, : 625–633. Otley, D. (1994). Management control in contemporary organizations: Towards a wider framework. Management Accounting Research, 5(3-4), 289-299. Ouchi, W.G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25(1), 129-141. Pernot, E., & Roodhooft, F. (2014). The impact of inter-organizational management control systems on performance: A retrospective case study of an automotive supplier relationship. International Journal of Production Economics, 158, 156-170. Rose, N., & Miller, P. (1992). Political power beyond the state: Problematics of govern- ment. The British Journal of Sociology, 43(2) 173. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780 32 Seal, W. (1999). Accounting and competitive tendering in UK local government: An institutionalist interpretation. Financial Accountability & Management, 15(3/4), 309. Sebti, H., Gérard, B., & Perray-Redslob, L. (2015). Identity Use of Management Accounting Systems by the Members of a Professional Group: The Case of the Purchasing Function. Accounting Auditing Control (A AC), 21(2), 13-32. Simons, R. (1995). Levers of control: How managers use innovative control systems to drive strategic renewal. Harvard Business School Press. Tessier, S., & Otley, D. (2012). A conceptual development of Simons' Levers of Control framework. Management Accounting Research, 23(3), 171-185. Tomkins, C. (2001). Interdependencies, trust and information in relationships, alliances and networks. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 26(2), 161-191. Tucker, B.P., & Parker, L.D. (2015). Business as usual? An institutional view of the rela- tionship between management control systems and strategy. Financial Accountability & Management, 31(2), 113-149. Tucker, B.P., & Parker, L.D. (2013). Out of control? Strategy in the NFP sector: The implications for management control. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 26(2), 234-266. Vélez, M.L., Sánchez J.M., & Álvarez-Dardet, C. (2008). Management control systems as inter-organizational trust builders in evolving relationships: Evidence from a lon- gitudinal case study. Accounting, Organizations & Society, 33(7/8), 968-994. Vosselman, E., Meer-Kooistra, J. van der (2009). Accounting for control and trust buil- ding in interfirm transactional relationships. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(2), 267-283. Williamson, O.E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies analysis and antitrust implications: A study in the economics of internal organization. The Free Press. Willis, C.D., Riley, B.L., Taylor, S.M., & Best, A. (2014). Improving the performance of interorganizational networks for preventing chronic disease: Identifying and acting on research needs. Healthcare Management Forum, 27(3), 123-127. COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT / Tome 27 – Volume 3 – septembre 2021 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926780

http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

ARN Conferences & Meetings SSRN

http://www.deepdyve.com/lp/ssrn/when-management-control-shapes-interorganizational-relationships-the-bjExgcP0Me

Loading next page...

eISSN: ARCH-4059
Publisher site: See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Journal

ARN Conferences & Meetings – SSRN

Published: Sep 6, 2021

Keywords: management control systems, inter-organizational relationships, health and social care facilities and services, ambivalence

Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

When Management Control Shapes Interorganizational Relationships The Case of the Introduction of a Dashboard in the Health and Social Care Sector

When Management Control Shapes Interorganizational Relationships The Case of the Introduction of a Dashboard in the Health and Social Care Sector

Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

When Management Control Shapes Interorganizational Relationships The Case of the Introduction of a Dashboard in the Health and Social Care Sector

When Management Control Shapes Interorganizational Relationships The Case of the Introduction of a Dashboard in the Health and Social Care Sector

Abstract

Journal

Recommended Articles

There are no references for this article.

Our policy towards the use of cookies