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Bargaining Models, Feminism, and Institutionalism

Bargaining Models, Feminism, and Institutionalism JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES Jel Vol.XXIX No.2 JuneJ995 Janet A. Seiz Many feminist economists have argued that neoclassical economics is woefully inadequate for inquiry into the economic lives of women. The neoclassical emphasis on "choice" is misleading, they say: neoclassical ac­ counts tend to pay too little attention (1) to systematic differences in the options available to men and women and (2) to the socially constructed nature of the "preferences" guiding choices. And neoclassical competitive­ market-equilibrium stories misrepresent the institutional settings and processes that generate occupational and distributional outcomes: we need much richer accounts with a broader range of actors and of sites and sorts of interaction. Institutional economists have been advancing similar criticisms for decades. This paper seeks to stimulate discussion of the commonalities be­ tween feminist and institutionalist methodological concerns; it focuses upon assessment of one possible alternative analytical approach-game­ theory-as applied to one set of phenomena, gender relations in the household. The Neoclassical Unitary Household Neoclassical work on many phenomena takes "the household" as the decision-making unit and portrays it as seeking to maximize a unitary household utility function. The analyst usually does not explain how this The author is Associate Professor of Economics at Grinnell http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Economic Issues Taylor & Francis

Bargaining Models, Feminism, and Institutionalism

Journal of Economic Issues , Volume 29 (2): 10 – Jun 1, 1995

Bargaining Models, Feminism, and Institutionalism

Journal of Economic Issues , Volume 29 (2): 10 – Jun 1, 1995

Abstract

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES Jel Vol.XXIX No.2 JuneJ995 Janet A. Seiz Many feminist economists have argued that neoclassical economics is woefully inadequate for inquiry into the economic lives of women. The neoclassical emphasis on "choice" is misleading, they say: neoclassical ac­ counts tend to pay too little attention (1) to systematic differences in the options available to men and women and (2) to the socially constructed nature of the "preferences" guiding choices. And neoclassical competitive­ market-equilibrium stories misrepresent the institutional settings and processes that generate occupational and distributional outcomes: we need much richer accounts with a broader range of actors and of sites and sorts of interaction. Institutional economists have been advancing similar criticisms for decades. This paper seeks to stimulate discussion of the commonalities be­ tween feminist and institutionalist methodological concerns; it focuses upon assessment of one possible alternative analytical approach-game­ theory-as applied to one set of phenomena, gender relations in the household. The Neoclassical Unitary Household Neoclassical work on many phenomena takes "the household" as the decision-making unit and portrays it as seeking to maximize a unitary household utility function. The analyst usually does not explain how this The author is Associate Professor of Economics at Grinnell

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References (18)

Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
© 1995 by Journal of Economic Issues–Association for Evolutionary Economics.
ISSN
1946-326X
eISSN
0021-3624
DOI
10.1080/00213624.1995.11505698
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES Jel Vol.XXIX No.2 JuneJ995 Janet A. Seiz Many feminist economists have argued that neoclassical economics is woefully inadequate for inquiry into the economic lives of women. The neoclassical emphasis on "choice" is misleading, they say: neoclassical ac­ counts tend to pay too little attention (1) to systematic differences in the options available to men and women and (2) to the socially constructed nature of the "preferences" guiding choices. And neoclassical competitive­ market-equilibrium stories misrepresent the institutional settings and processes that generate occupational and distributional outcomes: we need much richer accounts with a broader range of actors and of sites and sorts of interaction. Institutional economists have been advancing similar criticisms for decades. This paper seeks to stimulate discussion of the commonalities be­ tween feminist and institutionalist methodological concerns; it focuses upon assessment of one possible alternative analytical approach-game­ theory-as applied to one set of phenomena, gender relations in the household. The Neoclassical Unitary Household Neoclassical work on many phenomena takes "the household" as the decision-making unit and portrays it as seeking to maximize a unitary household utility function. The analyst usually does not explain how this The author is Associate Professor of Economics at Grinnell

Journal

Journal of Economic IssuesTaylor & Francis

Published: Jun 1, 1995

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