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G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons

G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Australasian Journal of Philosophy Taylor & Francis

G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons

Australasian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 84 (4): 10 – Dec 1, 2006
10 pages

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References (19)

Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN
1471-6828
eISSN
0004-8402
DOI
10.1080/00048400601079029
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.

Journal

Australasian Journal of PhilosophyTaylor & Francis

Published: Dec 1, 2006

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