Abstract

Non-state Armed Groups and UAVs: Uptake and Eec ff tiveness Policymakers and security experts are increasingly The group reverted to simpler dispersion methods. concerned about what non-state armed groups Individuals have also been convicted of planning (NSAGs) – including terrorist organisations – might to use UAVs in foiled terrorist attacks in the US, the do with uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), com- United Kingdom and Italy. monly known as drones, now that they have become In Ukraine, state forces as well as insurgents commercially available. Critically, however, NSAGs with the benefit of expert Russian guidance have cannot weaponise non-military UAVs quickly or adapted increasingly sophisticated COTS UAVs but easily, and generally face a steep learning curve. By used them mainly for intelligence, surveillance and way of comparison, the construction and employ- reconnaissance (ISR) purposes to minimise risks to ment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during manned aircraft. Both sides are experimenting with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars was gradual and weaponised UAV systems and have made design depended not only on the commercial availability improvements throughout the war. For instance, of the technology but also the transfer of technical earlier weaponised UAVs deployed by separatists in expertise within and among