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The Intra-Household Economics of Voice and Exit

The Intra-Household Economics of Voice and Exit This article evaluates the feminist and institutional dimensions of intra-household economics. A brief intellectual history of this emerging subfield of microeconomics argues that the weakness of the New Home Economics lies not only in its failure to deal with the individuals that make up the family, but also in its lack of recognition of systematic, gender- and age-based power relations which structure household resource allocation. A critical review of cooperative household bargaining models shows that while these effectively capture preference and externally-derived bargaining power heterogeneity among family members, they treat individuals symmetrically with respect to their ''voice'' (the right and ability to enter into the household bargaining process) and ''exit'' (the socially and economically constructed alternatives facing household members in the absence of a cooperative solution), and say little about the actual processes that lead to household resource allocation decisions. Noncooperative intra-household models, on the other hand, offer richer characterizations of household structures and processes, and can endogenously account for differences in power among family members. The final section proposes a research agenda emphasizing an interdisciplinary approach to both intrahousehold theory and empirical analysis. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Feminist Economics Taylor & Francis

The Intra-Household Economics of Voice and Exit

Feminist Economics , Volume 3 (3): 22 – Jan 1, 1997
22 pages

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References (1)

Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN
1466-4372
eISSN
1354-5701
DOI
10.1080/135457097338645
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This article evaluates the feminist and institutional dimensions of intra-household economics. A brief intellectual history of this emerging subfield of microeconomics argues that the weakness of the New Home Economics lies not only in its failure to deal with the individuals that make up the family, but also in its lack of recognition of systematic, gender- and age-based power relations which structure household resource allocation. A critical review of cooperative household bargaining models shows that while these effectively capture preference and externally-derived bargaining power heterogeneity among family members, they treat individuals symmetrically with respect to their ''voice'' (the right and ability to enter into the household bargaining process) and ''exit'' (the socially and economically constructed alternatives facing household members in the absence of a cooperative solution), and say little about the actual processes that lead to household resource allocation decisions. Noncooperative intra-household models, on the other hand, offer richer characterizations of household structures and processes, and can endogenously account for differences in power among family members. The final section proposes a research agenda emphasizing an interdisciplinary approach to both intrahousehold theory and empirical analysis.

Journal

Feminist EconomicsTaylor & Francis

Published: Jan 1, 1997

Keywords: Economics Of Gender; Game Theory; Bargaining Theory; Cooperative Games; Noncooperative Games; Household Behavior; Household Production

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