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The political economy of banking regulation: interest groups and rational choice in the formation of the Swedish banking system 1822–1921

The political economy of banking regulation: interest groups and rational choice in the formation... AbstractWe studied the implementation of banking regulation in Sweden from the origin of the commercial banking system until the important Banking Act of 1911. We also looked at the effects of these regulations. We found that regulations were often influenced by banker interests rather than by macroeconomic rationale, to the extent that banking legislation was an endogenous part of the banking business. Regulatory regimes that were rule-based (non-discretionary) and open for competition by providing clear and general benchmarks for establishments were more beneficial for financial and economic development than more protective and discretionary legislation. On the other hand, protective and discretionary legislation went hand in hand with bankers having greater influence on legislation. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Business History Taylor & Francis

The political economy of banking regulation: interest groups and rational choice in the formation of the Swedish banking system 1822–1921

Business History , Volume 63 (2): 21 – Feb 17, 2021

The political economy of banking regulation: interest groups and rational choice in the formation of the Swedish banking system 1822–1921

Business History , Volume 63 (2): 21 – Feb 17, 2021

Abstract

AbstractWe studied the implementation of banking regulation in Sweden from the origin of the commercial banking system until the important Banking Act of 1911. We also looked at the effects of these regulations. We found that regulations were often influenced by banker interests rather than by macroeconomic rationale, to the extent that banking legislation was an endogenous part of the banking business. Regulatory regimes that were rule-based (non-discretionary) and open for competition by providing clear and general benchmarks for establishments were more beneficial for financial and economic development than more protective and discretionary legislation. On the other hand, protective and discretionary legislation went hand in hand with bankers having greater influence on legislation.

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References (47)

Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
ISSN
1743-7938
eISSN
0007-6791
DOI
10.1080/00076791.2018.1564281
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractWe studied the implementation of banking regulation in Sweden from the origin of the commercial banking system until the important Banking Act of 1911. We also looked at the effects of these regulations. We found that regulations were often influenced by banker interests rather than by macroeconomic rationale, to the extent that banking legislation was an endogenous part of the banking business. Regulatory regimes that were rule-based (non-discretionary) and open for competition by providing clear and general benchmarks for establishments were more beneficial for financial and economic development than more protective and discretionary legislation. On the other hand, protective and discretionary legislation went hand in hand with bankers having greater influence on legislation.

Journal

Business HistoryTaylor & Francis

Published: Feb 17, 2021

Keywords: Corporate governance; crises; note issuance; Parliamentary debates; N13; N23

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